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“THE RULE OF THE STRONG, NOT THE RULE OF
LAW”: REEXAMINING IMPLICIT DIVESTITURE
AFTER MCGIRT V. OKLAHOMA
Joseph Palandrani*
In McGirt v. Oklahoma, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the boundaries
of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation, which were set in 1866 and which
encompass a large swath of present-day Oklahoma, remain intact. Although
non-Indigenous people had settled on the land in droves by the early
twentieth century, the Court held that the land remains “Indian Country”
until Congress explicitly indicates otherwise. Because Congress never so
indicated, the reservation is undiminished.
McGirt marked a massive shift in the Court’s approach to the question of
whether reservation boundaries remain in force; demographic history had
previously figured prominently in the Court’s rulings in this arena. The
Court has relied on similar historical evidence to inform its analysis of a
closely related set of questions: those pertaining to whether Indigenous
nations’ sovereign powers over their reservations extend to non-Indigenous
people. This Note argues that McGirt’s repudiation of a context-driven
inquiry in the former line of cases has ramifications for the latter. In
particular, this Note argues that the types of evidence and the modes of
reasoning that McGirt rejects have been central to the Court’s doctrine of
“implicit divestiture,” which holds that Indigenous nations have limited
authority over non-Indigenous people on reservations. This Note argues that
McGirt and implicit divestiture are incompatible.
This Note concludes that the Court, having undermined its theory of
implicit divestiture, should apply McGirt’s mode of analysis to questions
involving Indigenous nations’ territorial authority over reservations.
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INTRODUCTION
“Supreme Court Rules That About Half Of Oklahoma Is Native American
Land,” blared a representative headline on July 9, 2020, the final day that
opinions from the U.S. Supreme Court’s October 2019 term were
announced.1 That day, in McGirt v. Oklahoma,2 the Court ruled that the
Muscogee (Creek) Nation’s reservation retained the boundaries reflected in
an 1866 treaty;3 all of the land within those boundaries remains “Indian
Country,”4 no matter who owns the land within it.5 The Muscogee (Creek)
reservation spans a broad swath of Oklahoma, including “most of Tulsa.”6 It
does not, as the headline above suggests, stretch across half the state, but if
the similarly situated Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, and Seminole
reservations also retain their post–Civil War boundaries—and they almost
1. Laurel Wamsley, Supreme Court Rules That About Half of Oklahoma Is Native
American Land, NPR (July 9, 2020, 7:17 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/07/09
/889562040/supreme-court-rules-that-about-half-of-oklahoma-is-indian-land
[https://
perma.cc/KPL2-G8GU].
2. 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020).
3. See id. at 2461.
4. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151.
5. Id. (stating that all reservation land is Indian Country “notwithstanding the issuance
of any patent”).
6. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2479.
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certainly do7—then nearly all of eastern Oklahoma is indeed Indian
Country.8
McGirt provided rhetorical fodder for those with an interest in overstating
its effects. Senator Ted Cruz, for example, notoriously claimed that the Court
“gave away half of Oklahoma” and warned that “Manhattan is next.”9
Attorneys representing Oklahoma conjured the specter of a mass exodus
from state prisons once convictions for crimes committed on the
reservation—and therefore beyond state jurisdiction—became vulnerable to
vacation.10 Indian law experts, however, called it “absurd” to suggest that
the Muscogee (Creek) Nation’s victory in McGirt would drastically change
the laws by which most non-Indigenous people11 order their lives,12 let alone

7. See Elizabeth A. Reese, Welcome to the Maze: Race, Justice, and Jurisdiction in
McGirt v. Oklahoma, U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE (Aug. 13, 2020), https://lawreviewblog.
uchicago.edu/2020/08/13/mcgirt-reese/ [https://perma.cc/SBX7-CQQK]; see also McGirt,
140 S. Ct. at 2482 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Not only does the Court discover a Creek
reservation . . . but the Court’s reasoning portends that there are four more such reservations
in Oklahoma.”). A county judge in Oklahoma recently found, consistent with McGirt, that
the Choctaw Nation’s reservation was never disestablished. See Derrick James, Latimer
County Judge Rules County Located in ‘Indian Country,’ MCALESTER NEWS-CAP. (Dec. 16,
2020), https://www.mcalesternews.com/news/latimer-county-judge-rules-county-located-inindian-country/article_4884c9e2-4004-11eb-bc3a-cff1c5201ae9.html
[https://perma.cc
/W8UJ-94WC].
8. For a visual representation of the boundaries of the reservations in question, see Map
of the Indian and Oklahoma Territories (illustration) (1892), in Library of Congress
Geography and Map Division, LIBR. OF CONG., https://www.loc.gov/resource
/g4021e.ct000224/ [https://perma.cc/Y96F-27GX] (last visited Mar. 16, 2021).
9. Ted
Cruz
(@tedcruz),
TWITTER
(July
9,
2020,
12:52
PM),
https://twitter.com/tedcruz/status/1281269895519514625?s=20
[https://perma.cc/4J2SW6M6].
10. See Rebecca Nagle, Oklahoma’s Suspect Argument in Front of the Supreme Court,
ATLANTIC (May 8, 2020), https://theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/05/oklahomas-suspectargument-front-supreme-court/611284/ [https://perma.cc/A55C-WUYR] (explaining and
refuting these concerns).
11. The U.S. Code uses the terms “Indian” and “non-Indian,” but this Note will refer to
sovereigns and individuals as either “Indigenous” or “non-Indigenous” unless quoting directly
from another source. Although “Indigenous” refers broadly to people who trace their ancestry
to “pre-colonial and/or pre-settler societies” around the world, Reporting and Indigenous
Terminology, NATIVE AM. JOURNALISTS ASS’N, https://najanewsroom.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/11/NAJA_Reporting_and_Indigenous_Terminology_Guide.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SH7G-STVV] (last visited Mar. 16, 2021), this Note uses the term to refer
only to federally recognized American Indian nations and their citizens or members. This is
the least common denominator of the varying meanings borne by the term “Indian” in the U.S.
Code. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 3103(9), (11) (stating that “‘Indian’ means a member of an Indian
tribe,” where “Indian tribe” refers to “any Indian tribe, band, nation, Pueblo or other organized
group or community which is recognized as eligible for the special programs and services
provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as Indians”); id. § 1603(13),
(14) (stating the same but expressly including Alaska Native entities within “Indian tribe”).
This Note will use “Indigenous nations” to refer generally to Indigenous polities, but the
adjective “tribal” will denote particular aspects of those polities, as in “tribal courts” or “tribal
citizenship.” See Reporting and Indigenous Terminology, supra (referring to “tribal
membership or citizenship,” “tribal government,” and “tribal affiliation”). This Note will use
the terms of art “Indian Country” and “Indian law” where appropriate.
12. Reese, supra note 7.
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sweep their land titles out from under them.13 The Court decided only
“whether the land . . . promised” to the Muscogee (Creek) Nation by the
United States in a series of nineteenth-century treaties “remains an Indian
reservation for purposes of federal criminal law.”14 Specifically, the Court’s
affirmation of the reservation’s boundaries matters a great deal to Indigenous
people accused of, or victimized by, crimes involving other Indigenous
people,15 as the state “has no right to prosecute” defendants in such cases in
Indian Country.16
To be precise about the limited scope of McGirt’s holding is not to
discount its potentially profound ramifications.17 The Seventh Circuit
recently held that McGirt “turned what was a losing position for” a
Wisconsin village challenging the reservation status of Oneida Nation lands
“into a nearly frivolous one.”18 Additionally, because states’ powers to tax
enrolled citizens of Indigenous nations are more limited within Indian
Country than without,19 the Oklahoma Tax Commission estimates that $21.5
million in state taxes previously collected annually from within the treatydefined boundaries of the Muscogee (Creek) reservation are now unlawful
after McGirt.20 And McGirt may also invite reconsideration of ostensibly
unrelated principles of the Court’s Indian law jurisprudence—particularly as
that jurisprudence concerns Indigenous nations’ power to regulate
13. See Wamsley, supra note 1 (“It’s important to note that the case concerned
jurisdiction, not land ownership.”).
14. McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2459 (2020).
15. Some non-Indigenous criminal defendants will also be affected; the Violence Against
Women Reauthortization Act of 2013 granted Indigenous nations the ability to opt in to
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indigenous defendants accused of dating or domestic violence
against Indigenous victims. See Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 904, 127 Stat. 54, 120 (2013); see also
Mary Kathryn Nagle & Sarah Deer, Response, McGirt v. Oklahoma: A Victory for Native
Women, GEO. WASH. L. REV. ON DOCKET (July 20, 2020), https://www.gwlr.org/mcgirt-voklahoma-a-victory-for-native-women [https://perma.cc/2RAK-ZPTM] (discussing the
impediments to tribal prosecution of gender-based violence that the Court could have caused
had it decided McGirt differently).
16. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2460.
17. See, e.g., Reese, supra note 7 (detailing McGirt’s specific jurisdictional consequences
while also arguing that McGirt could portend further judicial or legislative adjustments to the
laws governing Indian Country).
18. Oneida Nation v. Village of Hobart, 968 F.3d 664, 685 (7th Cir. 2020).
19. Compare Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 462–67 (1995)
(permitting state income taxes on enrolled citizens of the Chickasaw Nation employed by the
Nation within Indian Country but living outside Indian Country), and Mescalero Apache Tribe
v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 157–58 (1973) (permitting state sales taxation of an off-reservation
business operated by the Mescalero Apache Tribe), with County of Yakima v. Confederated
Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 268–270 (1992) (striking down
state excise taxes on sales of reservation land parceled out under the General Allotment Act),
and McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 179–81 (1973) (invalidating state
income tax on an enrolled citizen of the Navajo Nation living on the Navajo reservation and
deriving income from reservation sources).
20. OKLA. TAX COMM’N, REPORT OF POTENTIAL IMPACT OF MCGIRT V. OKLAHOMA 2
(2020),
https://www.ok.gov/tax/documents/McGirt%20vs%20OK%20-%20Potential
%20Impact%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9DZY-WAFY]. This figure increases to $72.7
million if the analysis is extended to the treaty-defined territory of the Choctaw, Chickasaw,
Cherokee, and Seminole reservations. Id.
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reservation land owned by non-Indigenous people.21 Such is the position of
this Note.
McGirt at first seems only tenuously related to the topic this Note
addresses. The McGirt Court ruled on the scope of federal criminal
jurisdiction over enrolled citizens of federally recognized Indigenous
nations.22 This Note, by contrast, is concerned with tribal authority over
lands owned by non-Indigenous people within reservations. The McGirt
Court ruled on where the boundaries of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation’s
reservation lie;23 this Note analyzes what powers an Indigenous nation like
the Muscogee (Creek) may exercise over nonmembers who own land within
its territory.24
While accounting for the salience of these important differences, this Note
argues that the method by which Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion affirmed
the boundaries of the Muscogee (Creek) reservation is incompatible with the
method by which the Court has previously deduced substantive limitations
on Indigenous nations’ sovereign powers.25 In particular, this Note suggests
that McGirt’s text-bound readings of statutes that transformed reservations
into constellations of private parcels are irreconcilable with precedents that
relied on those same statutes and their real-world consequences to deprive
Indigenous nations of certain elements of territorial authority.26 McGirt
could—and should—therefore affect how courts evaluate tribal authority
over non-Indigenous fee landowners in the future.27
Part I outlines the paths the Court has taken in evaluating two related
questions. First, what sovereign powers can Indigenous nations exercise over
their entire reservations, especially when those reservations are populated by
non-Indigenous people? This part introduces one doctrine, often termed
“implicit divestiture,”28 that the Court has used to answer this question.29
Using this doctrine, the Court has diminished Indigenous nations’ territorial
authority,30 even when no express legislative pronouncements required such
a result.31 Second, does a particular reservation still exist and, if so, have its
boundaries changed? Part I proceeds to explore the methods the Court has
developed to answer this question and puts the relevant pre-McGirt
precedents in dialogue with implicit divestiture.32 Finally, Part I then

21. See infra Part II.
22. See generally McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020).
23. See generally id.
24. See infra Part I.A.
25. See infra Part II.
26. See infra Part II.
27. See infra Part III.
28. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978).
29. See infra Parts I.A.2–4.
30. Throughout this Note, “territorial authority” will refer to the substantive powers that
sovereigns enjoy within their borders—for example, the power to enforce criminal laws or
regulate land use.
31. See infra Parts I.A.2–4.
32. See infra Part I.B.
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examines McGirt, the Court’s most recent pronouncement on reservation
boundaries.33
Part II describes the tension between implicit divestiture and the reasoning
that prevailed in McGirt. This part identifies those elements of McGirt that
appear to contradict core precepts of implicit divestiture. Conversely, this
part shows the close resemblance between implicit divestiture’s bedrock
principles and the reasoning that sustains Chief Justice Roberts’s McGirt
opinion, which failed to command a majority.
Part III argues that although McGirt does not directly change the law on
tribal territorial authority, it will nevertheless be difficult for the Court to
persuasively maintain its theory of implicit divestiture after McGirt’s tacit
repudiation of the doctrine’s foundations. For that reason, this part argues
that implicit divestiture should be abandoned in favor of a rule for tribal
territorial authority that tracks McGirt’s rule for reservation boundaries:
namely, that anything promised by treaty or inherent to Indigenous nations
is retained unless expressly removed by Congress. Such a rule would
promote uniformity and predictability across related doctrines,34 clear the
interpretive hurdles that implicit divestiture has erected on facially
straightforward statutes,35 and advance important federal policies.36
I. PARALLEL TRACKS: IMPLICIT DIVESTITURE AND RESERVATION
DIMINISHMENT THROUGH MCGIRT
This part places McGirt in the context of the Court’s jurisprudence on
tribal territorial authority and reservation boundaries. Part I.A discusses the
development of the Court’s method for evaluating Indigenous nations’
territorial authority over non-Indigenous people on reservations. Part I.B
sketches the manner in which the Court has answered the related question of
whether land that once comprised a reservation retains its reservation status.
Part I.C presents aspects of McGirt’s majority opinion and dissent that bear
on the lines of precedent outlined in Parts I.A and I.B.
A. Implicit Divestiture of Tribal Territorial Authority
In a series of cases decided in the late twentieth century, the Court found
that the federal government had curtailed or withdrawn from Indigenous
nations certain aspects of territorial authority that were historically
considered inherent to sovereign status.37 These cases introduced a theory of
“implicit divestiture”38 according to which the United States, in addition to
abrogating tribal territorial authority through statutes and treaties, had also
33. See infra Part I.C.
34. See infra Part III.A.
35. See infra Part III.B.
36. See infra Part III.C.
37. See, e.g., Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492
U.S. 408 (1989); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); see also infra Parts I.A.2–3 (discussing the cited cases).
38. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978).
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nullified some attributes of territorial authority implicitly.39 Part I.A.1
examines the Court’s conceptions of Indigenous nations’ territorial authority
from the beginning of the nineteenth century through the late twentieth
century. Part I.A.2 describes the shift, beginning in the 1970s, in the Court’s
understanding of the scope of tribal territorial authority. Part I.A.3
demonstrates how the Court, drawing inferences from the federal
government’s repudiated allotment policy,40 arrived at the conclusion that
non-Indigenous settlement on reservation land implicitly limits Indigenous
nations’ territorial authority within those reservation boundaries. Part I.A.4
collects insights from scholars’ attempts to explain the developments detailed
in Parts I.A.1–3.
1. The Sovereign Baseline: Early Jurisprudence on Tribal Power
The Court once held a broad view of Indigenous nations’ territorial
authority over unceded land.41 Chief Justice John Marshall referred to
Indigenous nations as “domestic dependent nations” within the United
States.42 Domestic dependent nations had nearly full territorial authority
over their respective lands, and non-Indigenous people on Indigenous lands
were subject to the powers of the nation to which those lands were reserved.43
Addressing the treaty relationship between the United States and the
Cherokee Nation, Chief Justice Marshall wrote that the relevant treaties
showed the latter “claiming and receiving the protection” of the former; its
members had not “abandon[ed] their national character” nor “submit[ed] as
subjects to the laws of a master.”44
There were important caveats to Indigenous nations’ sovereign power
under this theory.45 In Johnson v. M’Intosh,46 for example, the Marshall
Court imposed limits on Indigenous nations’ authority to unilaterally cede or
convey land to parties other than the federal government.47 Even this
holding, however—which inscribed the morally (if not legally) repudiated

39. See, e.g., Brendale, 492 U.S. 408; Montana, 450 U.S. 544; Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191.
40. See infra notes 94–103 and accompanying text.
41. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832) (“[T]he several Indian
nations [are] distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their
authority is exclusive . . . .”).
42. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
43. See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561 (“The Cherokee nation . . . is a distinct
community occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the
laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter,
but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the
acts of congress.”).
44. Id. at 555.
45. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823) (holding that Indigenous
nations’ “complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished” upon
“discovery” by whichever European empire happened to claim the particular lands in
question).
46. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
47. See generally id.
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doctrine of discovery48 at the foundation of federal Indian law—does not
foreclose the retention of Indigenous nations’ territorial authority over land
reserved to them by treaty or statute.49 The M’Intosh Court did not
necessarily find that Indigenous nations were categorically impotent to grant
their own land titles.50 European “discovery” did not automatically abrogate
Indigenous nations’ power to convey title to non-Indigenous individuals; it
simply attached a preemption right of annexation that was good against other
European powers.51 In guaranteeing lands to Indigenous nations by treaty,
the United States expressly forbore the “consummat[ion]”52 of that right as
to the reserved territories.53 While titles granted by Indigenous sovereigns
were unprotected by American law and were susceptible to displacement by
conflicting grants from the federal government, such titles could still govern
land tenure within Indigenous territory.54
This jurisprudential conception of Indigenous nations’ power amounted to
a “historic presumption against the loss of tribal sovereignty.”55 Canons of
construction admonished courts to give effect to this presumption by
interpreting ambiguous treaties—and later statutes56—in favor of the
Indigenous nations impacted thereby.57 The federal judiciary upheld laws
48. See id. at 573 (holding that a European nation’s “discovery” of land “gave title to the
government . . . by whose authority, it was made, against all other European governments,
which title might be consummated by possession”).
49. See Richard A. Monette, Governing Private Property in Indian Country: The DoubleEdged Sword of the Trust Relationship and Trust Responsibility Arising out of Early Supreme
Court Opinions and the General Allotment Act, 25 N.M. L. REV. 35, 51–54 (1995).
50. See id.
51. See M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 587; see also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6
Pet.) 515, 544 (1832) (observing that “discovery” title alone “could not affect the rights of
those already in possession”); id. (“The United States succeeded to all the claims of Great
Britain, both territorial and political . . . . So far as [such claims] existed merely in theory, or
were in their nature only exclusive of the claims of other European nations, they . . . remain
dormant.”).
52. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 573; see supra note 48 and accompanying text.
53. See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 576, 557 (suggesting that “treaties” that effected
“cessions of territory” and set “boundaries” delineated the area “within which [the Cherokee
Nation’s] authority is exclusive”).
54. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 593 (“The person who purchases lands from the
Indians, within their territory, incorporates himself with them, so far as respects the property
purchased; holds their title under their protection, and subject to their laws.”). Philip Frickey
argued that M’Intosh’s invalidation of Indigenous title was compelled only because there was
a direct conflict between a land grant from the United States, on the one hand, and from an
Indigenous sovereign, on the other. In his view, M’Intosh is not a sweeping condemnation of
the power of Indigenous nations to govern the rights of those within their territories. See Philip
P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian
Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 37–38 (1999).
55. John Fredericks III, America’s First Nations: The Origins, History and Future of
American Indian Sovereignty, 7 J.L. & POL’Y 347, 396 (1999).
56. E.g., Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985) (“[S]tatutes are
to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their
benefit.”).
57. See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 552–54 (declining to find, on the basis of ambiguous
statutory provisions, that the Cherokee Nation forfeited core sovereign rights). The Court
continues to invoke these interpretive principles today. See McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct.
2452, 2470 (2020).
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and conditions of entry onto land that Indigenous nations applied to nonIndigenous people within their territories, such as permit taxes for conducting
business.58 Non-Indigenous people who purchased land and formed their
own communities on reservations remained subject to tribal rules,59 even
when Congress had expressly divested a governing Indigenous nation of
many critical elements of territorial authority.60 The forms of territorial
authority that were enforceable against non-Indigenous people ranged
widely,61 up to and including the power to seize property.62 Felix S. Cohen
described further elements of this rich conception of tribal territorial
authority in the first edition of his treatise on federal Indian law63: there, he
wrote that Indigenous nations possessed the power to remove,64 levy

58. See, e.g., Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905), appeal dismissed, 203 U.S.
599 (1906) (mem.). Nearly a century after dismissing an appeal from Buster’s ruling, the
Court noted that it had “never endorsed Buster’s statement that an Indian tribe’s ‘jurisdiction
to govern the inhabitants of a country is not conditioned or limited by the title to the land
which they occupy in it.’” Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 653 n.4 (2001)
(quoting Buster, 135 F. at 951). While the Court had cited Buster in Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 143–44 (1982), the Atkinson Court rejected the suggestion that
Merrion’s reference to Buster amounted to an embrace of Buster’s broad conception of
Indigenous territorial authority. See Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 653 n.4. However, the language
from Buster on which the Merrion Court relied to confirm that an Indigenous nation’s
authority to tax, inter alia, non-Indigenous people on reservations, “derives not from its power
to exclude, but from its power to govern and to raise revenues,” Merrion, 455 U.S. at 144, sits
immediately adjacent to the language rejected by the Atkinson Court. Compare Merrion, 455
U.S. at 144 (quoting Buster, 135 F. at 952), with Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 653 n.4 (quoting Buster,
135 F. at 951). Notwithstanding the Court’s characterization in Atkinson of its use of Buster
in prior precedents, Buster remains probative of the contemporaneous understanding of the
scope of tribal territorial authority.
59. See Buster, 135 F. at 953 (“[N]either the establishment of town sites nor the purchase
nor the occupancy by noncitizens of lots therein withdraws those lots or the town sites or their
occupants from the jurisdiction of the government of the Creek Nation . . . .”); see also Maxey
v. Wright, 54 S.W. 807, 809 (Indian Terr. 1900) (upholding a Muscogee (Creek) Nation permit
fee collected from non-Indigenous attorneys); James Matthew V. Martin, The Cherokee
Supreme Court: 1823–1835, at 99–100 (Dec. 2018) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Nevada)
(on file with author) (suggesting that non-Indigenous litigants in the early nineteenth century
submitted themselves to the Cherokee Nation’s courts for suits concerning reservation
property).
60. Buster, 135 F. at 951 (“[T]he United States by various acts of Congress deprived this
tribe of all its judicial power, and curtailed its remaining authority until its powers of
government have become the mere shadows of their former selves. Nevertheless its authority
to fix the terms upon which noncitizens might conduct business within its territorial
boundaries . . . remained undisturbed.”).
61. See Brief for Amici Curiae Historians & Legal Scholars Gregory Ablavsky et al. in
Support of Respondents at 16–17, Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 136
S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (No. 13-1496) (listing tribal regulations to demonstrate “tribes’ power,
even at its nineteenth-century nadir, to enforce their laws against non-Indians on tribal land”).
62. See Hamilton v. United States, 42 Ct. Cl. 282, 285 (1907) (upholding the Choctaw
Nation’s seizure of storehouses owned by non-Indigenous business partners because the
United States had promised the Choctaw Nation it could “maintain a domestic government for
the regulation of their own internal affairs”).
63. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 142–45 (1942).
64. Id. at 143.
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property taxes on,65 and prescribe property laws affecting anyone, including
non-Indigenous people, residing on reservation land.66
2. Changes in the Status of “Domestic Dependent Nations”
For much of the twentieth century, the Court presumed that Indigenous
nations retained attributes of territorial authority that Congress had not
expressly abrogated.67 Although the Marshall Court’s understanding of
Indigenous nations’ autonomy within reservations had changed slightly over
time,68 the Court had never held that reservationwide territorial authority had
been implicitly revoked. At most, the Court found that previously exclusive
tribal territorial authority had become concurrent with a modicum of state
authority.69 Indigenous nations retained their territorial authority,70 even
when that authority operated on non-Indigenous people.71
This changed significantly in 1978, when the Court issued its opinion in
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe.72 There, the Court held that Indigenous
nations’ “dependent” status, as defined in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,73
necessitated restrictions on tribal territorial authority beyond those stipulated
in “specific restrictions in treaties or congressional enactments.”74
Specifically, the Oliphant Court ruled that Indigenous nations’ domestic
65. Id. at 142.
66. Id. at 144–45.
67. See McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 173–75 (1973)
(recognizing a “tradition of sovereignty” prohibiting state encroachment on Indigenous
nations’ independence on reservation lands absent clear congressional permission); Williams
v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959) (upholding exclusive tribal jurisdiction over a lawsuit
brought by a non-Indigenous person against an Indigenous person regarding reservation-based
transactions and observing that the “basic policy” of maintaining Indigenous nations’
sovereign autonomy “remained”); see also United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905)
(describing a treaty establishing a reservation not as “a grant of rights to the Indians, but a
grant of rights from them—a reservation of those not granted”).
68. See McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 171 (“[N]otions of Indian sovereignty have been
adjusted to take account of the State’s legitimate interests in regulating the affairs of nonIndians.”); Williams, 358 U.S. at 219 (noting that categorical prohibitions on state regulatory
power on reservations no longer held “in cases where essential tribal relations were not
involved and where the rights of Indians would not be jeopardized”). For an introduction to
the Court’s early understanding of Indigenous territorial authority, see supra notes 41–54 and
accompanying text.
69. See McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 171 (citing cases upholding state taxation and
prosecutorial powers over non-Indigenous people on reservations); Williams, 358 U.S. at 219–
20 (citing cases upholding state criminal jurisdiction over non-Indigenous people on
reservations and state court civil jurisdiction over Indigenous litigants).
70. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (“Indian tribes are unique
aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their
territory . . . .” (emphasis added) (citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557
(1832))).
71. See Williams, 358 U.S. at 223 (upholding exclusive tribal court jurisdiction over a
non-Indigenous person involved in a reservation-based suit and finding it “immaterial that
respondent” was not Indigenous, because he “was on the Reservation and the transaction with
an Indian took place there”).
72. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
73. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); see also supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text.
74. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208.
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dependent status immunized nonmember U.S. citizens from tribal criminal
sanctions.75 The Court rested on the novel theory76 that the United States’s
“solicitude that its citizens be protected . . . from unwarranted intrusions on
their personal liberty” renders Indigenous nations’ power to prosecute nonIndigenous people “inconsistent with [Indigenous nations’] status” of
“dependence on the Federal Government.”77
Before Oliphant, statutes and treaties determined which sovereigns
maintained criminal jurisdiction over reservations.78 Several treaties
contemplated tribal power to punish non-Indigenous people.79 When such
powers were named, they were counted as preexisting, inherent elements of
tribal territorial authority that positive law simply affirmed.80 Oliphant
reversed this understanding of retained territorial authority: the Court
construed textual invocations of tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonIndigenous people as conferrals from the federal government, not
acknowledgments of extant powers.81
Oliphant’s concern for individual liberties recalls the protections of the
Bill of Rights; for this reason, the holding appears “quasi-constitutional.”82
75. See id. at 210. This holding is no longer universally applicable. See supra note 15.
76. See Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction over Nonmembers in
Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1047, 1056 (2005) (describing “the principle that
simply by incorporation within the United States tribes had lost inherent criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians” as “something wholly new in Indian law” at the time Oliphant was decided).
77. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208, 210 (emphasis omitted).
78. See COHEN, supra note 63, at 363–65 (detailing an entirely statutory and treaty-based
body of law governing criminal jurisdiction over non-Indigenous people in Indian Country).
79. Id. at 364 (observing that “[e]arly treaties frequently provided that non-Indians
committing offenses in the Indian country against Indians should be subject to punishment by
tribal authorities”); see also id. at 45 (describing some early treaties guaranteeing tribal
prosecutorial power over non-Indigenous people on reservations).
80. See id. at 145–46, 146 n.212 (observing that the United States, in several treaties,
including the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Cherokee Nation-U.S., art. 8, July 2, 1791, 7
Stat. 39, 40, “expressly recognized” Indigenous nations’ “original sovereign power[]” to
“punish aliens within [their] jurisdiction according to [their] own laws and customs,” which
power endures “save as it has been expressly limited by the acts of a superior government”).
The 1942 edition of Cohen’s treatise is not entirely consistent on this point, but where it
contradicts the language quoted above, it rests on scant authority. In one passage, Cohen
suggests, without direct support, that tribal courts have no inherent criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indigenous people because Indigenous sovereigns lack the “common law principle of the
territoriality of criminal law.” Id. at 360. Elsewhere, Cohen states that “attempts of tribes to
exercise [criminal] jurisdiction over non-Indians . . . have been generally condemned by the
federal courts since the end of the treaty-making period.” Id. at 148. The only case cited, Ex
parte Kenyon, found that tribal criminal jurisdiction was limited to tribal citizens, but the case
supported this proposition with a statute; it did not suggest that the lack of criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indigenous people was a necessary, implicit consequence of domestic dependent
nation status. See Ex parte Kenyon, 14 F. Cas. 353, 355 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1878) (No. 7,720)
(citing 28 Rev. Stat. § 2146 (1873)).
81. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 198 n.8 (noting that “[f]ar from representing a recognition
of any inherent Indian criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians settling on tribal lands, these
[treaty] provisions,” acknowledging tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indigenous
trespassers, “were instead intended as a means of discouraging non-Indian settlements on
Indian territory, in contravention of treaty provisions to the contrary”).
82. Frickey, supra note 54, at 65–66, 73–75. Before Oliphant was decided, Congress
enacted a quasi–Bill of Rights that limited tribal governments’ power, including in the realm
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This inchoate sense that the United States is constitutionally compelled to
protect its citizens from the coercive power of Indigenous nations of which
they are not constituents rose to the surface in Duro v. Reina.83 There, the
Court suggested that congressional efforts to expand tribal criminal
jurisdiction beyond the citizens of the prosecuting Indigenous nation would
be unconstitutional.84 The consequences of this suggestion, however, never
came to fruition: the Court upheld subsequent legislation that allowed
Indigenous nations to prosecute some people outside their own citizenry.85
Oliphant and its progeny are therefore squarely within the domain of federal
common law—not constitutional jurisprudence.86
Part I.A.3 describes how this common-law doctrine of implicit divestiture
spilled over from the criminal context into the civil context and further
complicated Indigenous nations’ territorial authority.
3. Tribal Territorial Authority over Non-Indigenous Property Within
Allotted Reservations
Paeans to the territorial reach of tribal authority did not disappear abruptly
from the Court’s decisions after Oliphant.87 Nevertheless, soon after
Oliphant was decided, the Court found further implied limitations on tribal
territorial authority in the civil context.88 In Montana v. United States,89 the
Court held that Indigenous nations have limited power to regulate the land
uses of non-Indigenous owners of fee lands within reservations.90 This
holding imported Oliphant’s restrictions on the inherent powers of domestic
dependent nations91 and expanded them to include an additional legal theory:
when Congress breaks a treaty promise to “set apart” reservations “for the

of criminal procedure. See Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 202, 82
Stat. 73, 77 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1302).
83. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
84. Id. at 693–94 (finding “constitutional limitations . . . on the ability of Congress to
subject American citizens to criminal proceedings before a tribunal that does not provide
constitutional protections as a matter of right” and suggesting that such concerns may apply
to tribal courts); see also Frickey, supra note 54, at 40 (noting the significance of the Duro
Court’s suggestion that Congress may be constitutionally barred from acknowledging tribal
jurisdiction over nonmembers).
85. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 196 (2004); see also supra note 15 (discussing
Congress’s 2013 recognition of Indigenous nations’ authority to prosecute some nonIndigenous defendants).
86. See Frickey, supra note 54, at 58.
87. See, e.g., Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987) (“Tribal authority over
the activities of non-Indians on reservation lands is an important part of tribal sovereignty.”);
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982) (noting that “[t]he power to tax
is an essential attribute of Indian sovereignty because it is a necessary instrument of selfgovernment and territorial management” and upholding tribal taxes on non-Indigenous
people and corporations within the Jicarilla Apache Nation reservation (emphasis added)).
88. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 563–67 (1981).
89. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
90. See generally id.
91. See id. at 565 (citing Oliphant for “the general proposition that the inherent sovereign
powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe”).
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absolute and undisturbed use and occupation”92 of Indigenous nations, tribal
territorial authority over the land is implicitly revoked as to non-Indigenous
fee lands.93
Montana concerned lands that had originally been parceled out of the
Crow Tribe’s reservation in the early twentieth century,94 pursuant to the
allotment program that the United States adopted in 1887.95 In enacting its
allotment policy, the United States unilaterally divided reservations into
parcels of private land titles vested in individual tribal citizens.96 Once
certain restrictions on alienation were lifted,97 individuals with allotted lands
became fully “subject to the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State or
Territory in which they . . . reside[d].”98 Because unrestricted private fee
titles could be purchased by anyone, non-Indigenous people acquired a
tremendous amount of reservation land.99 Congress acknowledged that its
allotment policy had resulted in devastating land loss among Indigenous
nations and individuals and abandoned the program in 1934.100 Though this
repudiation did not amount to a wholesale reversal of the policy,101 Congress
did walk back states’ broad license to preside over allotted fee lands in 1948.
That year, it defined Indian Country—that is, “country within which Indian
laws and customs and federal laws relating to Indians are generally
applicable”102—to include all reservation land irrespective of ownership.103
The Montana Court denied the Crow Tribe’s power to restrict nonIndigenous hunting and fishing within reservation boundaries, including on
92. Id. at 548 (quoting Treaty With the Crow Indians, Crow Nation-U.S., May 7, 1868,
15 Stat. 649).
93. See id. at 558–63.
94. Id.
95. See General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.).
96. See 1 COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 16.03(2)(a) (Nell Jessup
Newton ed., 2019).
97. See id. § 16.03(2)(b).
98. See § 6, 24 Stat. at 390 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 349).
99. See David A. Chang, Enclosures of Land and Sovereignty: The Allotment of American
Indian Lands, RADICAL HIST. REV., Winter 2011, at 108, 108–10 (explaining that roughly
eighty-six million acres were taken from Indigenous people nationwide during the allotment
period, leading to mass Indigenous landlessness); see also Kristen A. Carpenter & Angela R.
Riley, Privatizing the Reservation?, 71 STAN. L. REV. 791, 816–17 (2019) (describing
Indigenous resistance to the allotment policy and to the fraudulent methods by which nonIndigenous settlers often acquired reservation parcels).
100. See Indian Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 73-383, § 1, 48 Stat. 984, 984 (1934)
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 5101); see also 1 COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW,
supra note 96, § 16.03(2)(c) (describing the Indian Reorganization Act’s departures from the
allotment policy).
101. See County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,
502 U.S. 251, 270 (1992) (construing an allotment statute to allow state taxation of
Indigenous-owned reservation parcels). But see Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment,
27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 25–26 (1995) (critiquing County of Yakima for giving continuing effect to
allotment statutes in spite of the post-1934 abandonment of the allotment program).
102. 1 COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 96, § 3.04(1).
103. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-772, § 1, 62 Stat. 683, 757 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1151(a)).
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post-allotment fee lands owned by non-Indigenous people.104 The Court held
that “treaty rights with respect to reservation lands must be read in light of
the subsequent alienation of those lands,”105 and in particular, in light of the
fact that the “avowed purpose of the allotment policy was the ultimate
destruction of tribal government.”106 The Court found the Crow Tribe’s full
territorial authority to be conditioned on its “absolute and undisturbed use
and occupation”107 of its reservation.108 Indigenous nations’ “dependent”
status, after Oliphant, cabined their territorial authority to matters directly
affecting tribal citizens.109 Only when a reservation was exclusively
inhabited by an Indigenous nation’s citizens, the Court reasoned, was the
power to govern tribal territory coextensive with the power to govern
“internal [tribal] relations.”110 When Congress, aiming to abolish Indigenous
nations as polities, forced the Crow Tribe to allow non-Indigenous people to
settle on Crow land, the Tribe’s territorial authority was correspondingly
diminished.111 The Court subjected this prohibition on tribal regulatory
power over non-Indigenous land to two exceptions: where non-Indigenous
people have expressed some form of consent to tribal regulation112 and where
the core internal concerns of the Indigenous nation were implicated.113

104. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 559 (1981). When Montana was decided,
non-Indigenous people owned “approximately 28 percent” of the land within the Crow Tribe
reservation. Id. at 548.
105. Id. at 561 (citing Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep’t of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 174 (1977)).
106. Id. at 561 n.9.
107. Id. at 548 (quoting Treaty With the Crow Indians, Crow Nation-U.S., May 7, 1868,
15 Stat. 649).
108. Id. at 558–59.
109. See id. at 563–65.
110. Id. at 564 (“[R]egulation of hunting and fishing by nonmembers of a tribe on lands no
longer owned by the tribe bears no clear relationship to tribal self-government or internal
relations . . . .”).
111. Id. at 561 (citing Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep’t of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 174 (1977)).
But see South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 691 (1993) (“To focus on [congressional]
purpose is to misread Montana.”). The Court’s reliance on congressional intent has ebbed and
flowed throughout the Montana line of cases. Cf. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S.
645, 650 n.1 (2001) (citing Montana’s language on the intent of the General Allotment Act
and the Act’s resulting effects on tribal power); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of
the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 422–23, 437, 441, 447 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(relying on the intent of an allotment-era Congress to find the Yakima Nation without power
to zone parts of its reservation).
112. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 565 (holding that “the activities of nonmembers who enter
consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts,
leases, or other arrangements” may be subject to tribal territorial authority).
113. See id. at 566 (allowing that an Indigenous nation’s “inherent power to exercise civil
authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation” may be lawful
“when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe”). The Court has narrowly construed this
exception. See, e.g., Brendale, 492 U.S. at 428–29 (finding tribal authority to zone reservation
land inessential to guarding “the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or
welfare” of Indigenous nations); see also Plains Com. Bank v. Long Fam. Land & Cattle Co.,
554 U.S. 316, 340–41 (2008) (reaching the same conclusion as to tribal authority to regulate
sales of reservation land).
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The consensus among the Justices in Montana114 fractured in Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation.115 At issue in
Brendale were conflicting sets of zoning regulations: one imposed by the
Yakima Nation over its reservation and one imposed by the County of
Yakima.116 Both regimes purported to reach fee lands situated in an area
where the reservation and the county overlapped.117 A divided Court, ruling
on the validity of the regulations, produced three opinions, none of which
commanded a majority.118 Two diametrically opposed bright-line rules sat
at the extremes of the Court’s disposition—one prescribing a strong
presumption against tribal authority over non-Indigenous reservation land,119
the other favoring a strong presumption for it120—between which Justice
John Paul Stevens proposed a functional, context-specific analysis.121 Six
Justices agreed, however, that allotment had deprived the Yakima Nation of
considerable power to regulate non-Indigenous land use within its
reservation.122
The plurality’s theory of divestiture closely tracked that of the Montana
Court’s.123 Justice Byron White declined to recognize Indigenous territorial
authority “to the extent it involve[d] a tribe’s ‘external relations.’”124
Proscribed powers pertaining to “external relations” included, for Justice
White, the ability to “regulate the use of [reservation] fee land”125 when an
Indigenous nation “no longer retains the ‘exclusive use and benefit’” of its
reservation.126 Once Congress revoked the power to exclude, Indigenous
nations were without authority to set land use policy binding on any nonIndigenous owner of reservation land, unless one of the Montana exceptions
applied.127

114. The Montana Court was divided on a separate question but unanimous in finding the
Crow Tribe without power to categorically limit hunting and fishing on the reservation to
members of the Crow Tribe. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 567–69 (Stevens, J., concurring)
(remaining silent on the aspects of the majority opinion relevant to this Note); id. at 581 n.18
(Blackmun, J., dissenting in part) (“I agree with the Court’s resolution of the question of the
power of the Tribe to regulate non-Indian fishing and hunting on reservation land owned in
fee by nonmembers of the Tribe.”).
115. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
116. Id. at 416.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 425–27; id. at 433 (Stevens, J., concurring in part); id. at 448 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
119. Id. at 414 (plurality opinion).
120. Id. at 448 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
121. Id. at 433 (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
122. Id. at 414–32 (plurality opinion); id. at 444–47 (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
123. See id. at 422–28 (plurality opinion).
124. Id. at 425–26 (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978)).
125. Id. at 430.
126. Id. at 422 (quoting Treaty With the Yakamas, U.S.-Yakima Nation, art. 2, June 9,
1855, 12 Stat. 951).
127. See supra notes 112–13 and accompanying text (describing the exceptions to
Montana’s limitations on tribal territorial authority). In the plurality’s view, neither exception
was available to the Yakima Nation. See Brendale, 492 U.S. at 428–32 (plurality opinion).

2390

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

Justice Stevens was less interested in the abstract right to exclude than he
was in the extent of actual exclusion.128 In his view, allotment did not
automatically remove the Yakima Nation’s power to zone its reservation;
instead, allotment-enabled, non-Indigenous settlement on the reservation
limited the Nation’s territorial authority.129 Part of the disputed region of the
reservation was off-limits to anyone who neither owned land therein nor had
any associations with the Nation; the remainder of the region was open to the
general public130 and was inhabited primarily by noncitizens of the
Nation.131 Justice Stevens wrote, and a bare majority of the Court agreed,
that the Yakima Nation retained the power to regulate land use in the former
portion.132 The Nation’s power to zone non-Indigenous reservation land
extended as far as, but no further than,133 that afforded by an equitable
servitude.134 As long as a particular area in a reservation retained its “pristine
character”135 as an “undeveloped refuge,”136 non-Indigenous owners of
parcels within that area accepted their titles subject to tribal rules designed to
protect the area’s “traditional character.”137 Conversely, such restrictions
became “outmoded,”138 and therefore invalid, once the pre-allotment
character of a swath of reservation territory gave way to an “integrated
community” consisting of both Indigenous and non-Indigenous people.139
Justice Stevens reasoned that Congress, in allotting the Yakima Nation’s
reservation, must have intended to dissolve tribal territorial authority over
lands where non-Indigenous people, “who lack any voice in setting tribal
policy,” had densely settled.140 In Justice Stevens’s framing, as in Justice

128. Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 23 (1991);
see Brendale, 492 U.S. at 441–43 (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
129. See Brendale, 492 U.S. at 441–45 (Stevens, J., concurring in part) (arguing that
Indigenous nations retain territorial authority when a small number of non-Indigenous people
acquire reservation land but lose that authority as non-Indigenous people settle more densely
on the reservation).
130. Id. at 415–16 (plurality opinion).
131. Id. at 445 (Stevens, J., concurring in part) (noting that the Yakima Nation’s members
constituted “less than 20 percent” of the population in this part of the reservation).
132. See id. at 433–44.
133. On this point, Justice Stevens did not have a majority. Justices Blackmun, Marshall,
and Brennan would have upheld the Yakima Nation’s power to zone the entire reservation.
See id. at 448–68 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
134. Id. at 442 (Stevens, J., concurring in part) (“[T]he Tribe’s power to zone is like an
equitable servitude; the burden of complying with the Tribe’s zoning rules runs with the land
without regard to how a particular estate is transferred.”).
135. Id. at 440.
136. Id. at 441.
137. Id. at 435.
138. Id. at 447 (locating the Yakima Nation’s loss of zoning authority in the “‘change of
neighborhood’ doctrine,” by which “an equitable servitude lapses when the restriction, as
applied to ‘the general vicinity and not merely a few parcels,’” is no longer consistent with a
property’s surroundings (quoting R. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.20 (1984))).
139. See id. at 444–45 (“Because the Tribe no longer has the power to exclude nonmembers
from a large portion of this area, it also lacks the power to define the essential character of the
territory.”).
140. Id. at 437; see also id. at 447 (articulating this point again).
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White’s, allotment “to some extent reworked fundamental notions of Indian
sovereignty.”141
Brendale and Montana demonstrate how, by subtle elision, Indigenous
nations’ territorial authority was vacated of much of its binding power over
non-Indigenous people.142 The Montana Court and the Brendale plurality
relied on language from United States v. Wheeler,143 a case that recognized
no Indigenous sovereignty “involving the relations between an Indian tribe
and nonmembers of the tribe.”144 The Wheeler Court derived this
membership-limited conception of tribal territorial authority primarily from
Oliphant145 and nineteenth-century decisions that had in fact contemplated a
territorial authority that went beyond tribal citizenship.146 Justice Stevens’s
Brendale opinion, by contrast, cited neither Oliphant nor Wheeler but bristled
with the same concerns about subjecting non-Indigenous individuals to tribal
authority that animated the Court’s ruling in Oliphant.147 If the text of the
General Allotment Act148 expressly eclipsed erstwhile promises that
Indigenous nations would have their reservations to themselves, the Court
found that the Act also cast penumbras that blotted out the authority to govern
the new settlements.149
4. Evaluating Implicit Divestiture: Scholarly Assessments of the Doctrine
By the time the Court began to find new, implied limitations on tribal
territorial authority in the late 1970s, Congress had given up both the
allotment program and a subsequent policy, which it called “termination,”
that similarly attempted to disband Indigenous nations and “subject Indians
to state and federal laws on exactly the same terms as other citizens.”150
Congress, spurred by Indigenous organizing,151 instead staked out an
enduring position in favor of Indigenous nations’ autonomy.152 The Court
141. Id. at 436.
142. See supra notes 89–141 and accompanying text (discussing the progression of implicit
divestiture in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), and Brendale).
143. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
144. Id. at 326; see Brendale, 492 U.S. at 425–26, 427 (plurality opinion) (examining the
quoted language from Wheeler); Montana, 450 U.S. at 563–64 (same).
145. See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323, 325 n.22 (citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
435 U.S. 191, 191, 203–04 (1978)); see also supra notes 72–81 and accompanying text
(discussing Oliphant).
146. See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326 (first citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515
(1832); then citing Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); then citing Johnson
v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); and then citing Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) 87 (1810)); see also supra Part I.A.1 (discussing the Court’s nineteenth-century
conception of tribal territorial authority).
147. See supra notes 75–77, 82 and accompanying text.
148. Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.).
149. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S.
408, 422–28 (1989) (plurality opinion); id. at 444–48 (Stevens, J., concurring in part);
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 557–61, 563–65 (1981).
150. 1 COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 96, § 1.06.
151. See Carpenter & Riley, supra note 99, at 823.
152. See 1 COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 96, § 1.07 (indicating
that the federal government has officially prioritized Indigenous nations’ self-determination
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therefore winnowed down the scope of tribal territorial authority as Congress
was intent on expanding it and, conversely, expanded non-Indigenous
immunities from tribal authority when federal policy was least compatible
with those immunities.153
Justice Harry Blackmun registered this dissonance in his Brendale
dissent,154 and scholars have since amplified and developed his critiques.155
Pointing to the “Federal Government’s active and ‘longstanding policy of
encouraging tribal self-government,’”156 Justice Blackmun argued that any
hopes for the dissolution of tribal polities that Congress may have harbored
when it began allotting reservations157 should be displaced by more recent
congressional efforts to restore tribal authority.158 This comported, he
argued, with the Court’s long-standing hesitation to deprive Indigenous
nations of powers Congress had not expressly withdrawn159—a reluctance
that survived Oliphant and Montana.160 While Justice Blackmun did not cast
aspersions on Oliphant,161 he denied that its reasoning could be extended to
exempt non-Indigenous people from Indigenous territorial authority beyond
the criminal context.162 For Justice Blackmun, Justice White’s Brendale
opinion too readily found domestic dependent nation status incompatible
with territorial authority over non-Indigenous land,163 while Justice

continuously since 1961); see also Royster, supra note 101, at 18–20 (summarizing the
transition from the termination era to the self-determination era and noting that a
“cornerstone[]” of the latter is “tribal control over the Indian Country”).
153. This conflict has at times led Congress to reverse Court-imposed restrictions on tribal
territorial authority. See Royster, supra note 101, at 73–74; see also supra note 85 and
accompanying text (discussing the legislative rejection of the Court’s holding in Duro v.
Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990)).
154. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408,
467 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Blackmun also noted that Montana “contains language flatly inconsistent with [the Court’s]
prior decisions defining the scope of inherent tribal jurisdiction.” Id. at 455. Justice Blackmun
had, however, joined the relevant portions of the Montana majority opinion. See supra note
114 and accompanying text.
155. See infra notes 165–74 and accompanying text.
156. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 467 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14 (1987)).
157. See supra notes 106, 140 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s inferences
about congressional intent during the allotment era).
158. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 464 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part); see also supra notes 100–03 and accompanying text (discussing
Congress’s abandonment of the allotment policy).
159. See Brendale, 492 U.S. at 451–54 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
160. See id. at 454–55 (discussing cases decided after Montana in which reservationwide
tribal territorial authority was upheld in the absence of specific acts of Congress).
161. Id. at 453. Justice Blackmun joined the Court’s opinion in Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
162. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 453–54 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
163. Id. at 451–55.
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Stevens’s theory of a territorial authority that varied according to reservation
demographics baselessly froze Indigenous life in amber.164
Scholars who largely share in Justice Blackmun’s critiques have attributed
the Court’s adoption of implicit divestiture to its special attentiveness to nonIndigenous interests when they seem to conflict with the interests of
Indigenous nations.165 Echoing Justice Blackmun’s quarrel with Justice
Stevens in Brendale, Bethany Berger has identified a sort of tribal
originalism in the Court’s jurisprudence, where only “traditional” tribal
interests merit the protection of tribal territorial authority.166 Conversely,
Indigenous nations’ right to “make their own laws and be ruled by them”167
has no bearing on most matters involving non-Indigenous people on
reservations.168 Professor Berger argues that the Court’s apparent suspicion
that tribal institutions will discriminate against non-Indigenous people
bolsters the Court’s conception of a territorial power that applies only to
tribal citizens.169 Meanwhile, Ann Tweedy has noted that the Court treats
non-Indigenous landowners’ repose in their property’s freedom from tribal
territorial authority as an “equitable defense” to Indian Country’s170
statutorily clear reservationwide sweep.171 This sense that the Court has
exercised its equitable discretion sub silentio also appears in Judith Royster’s
work, which suggests that implicit divestiture has transformed nonIndigenous settlers’ “psychological reliance” on the allotment-era promise of
land titles unburdened by tribal regulation into a “sort of vested right.”172
Philip Frickey similarly remarked that the Montana Court felt compelled to
safeguard “basic Anglo-American assumptions about the autonomy of
property owners.”173 Finally, for Joseph William Singer, Brendale suggests
164. See id. at 464–65 (arguing that Justice Stevens’s test relied on a “stereotyped and
almost patronizing view of Indians and reservation life” according to which Indigenous
nations retain their territorial authority only to the extent that “they forgo economic
development and maintain [their] reservations according to a single, perhaps quaint, view of
what is characteristically ‘Indian’ today”).
165. But see generally Michael Doran, Redefining Tribal Sovereignty for the Era of
Fundamental Rights, 95 IND. L.J. 87 (2020) (defending implicit divestiture as a justifiable
attempt to balance the fundamental constitutional rights of non-Indigenous people against the
unique position of Indigenous nations in the constitutional scheme).
166. See Berger, supra note 76, at 1058–59.
167. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
168. Berger, supra note 76, at 1050 (arguing that the Court’s jurisprudence rests on the
assumption that “jurisdiction over nonmembers and legal issues shaped by outside influence,
such as those involving commerce with nonmembers, have little to do with tribal selfgovernment”).
169. Id.; see also id. at 1067–94 (examining Navajo Nation court proceedings involving
non-Navajo litigants to refute this suspicion).
170. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a); see also supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text
(discussing the 1948 redefinition of “Indian Country”).
171. Ann E. Tweedy, Unjustifiable Expectations: Laying to Rest the Ghosts of AllotmentEra Settlers, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 129, 181 (2012); see also id. at 137–38, 144 (arguing that
when the Court has divested Indigenous nations of territorial authority, it has been guided by
the assumptions of non-Indigenous people who settled on reservations pursuant to the
allotment policy).
172. Royster, supra note 101, at 71.
173. Frickey, supra note 54, at 48.
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that “non-Indians cannot trust tribal governments to treat them right, but . . .
American Indians can and should expect fair treatment from the states and
the federal courts.”174
Non-Indigenous presence and land ownership within reservations, then,
has strongly influenced the Court’s understanding of tribal territorial
authority.175 In this important sense, the Court’s implicit divestiture
jurisprudence dovetailed with its pre-McGirt precedents on reservation
diminishment and disestablishment—the subject of the next section of this
Note.
B. Reservation Disestablishment Before McGirt
Part I.A described the course the Court has taken in defining the elements
of territorial authority that Indigenous nations are able to exercise throughout
their reservations. In particular, Part I.A.2 and Part I.A.3 demonstrated that
the Court has, in recent decades, found Indigenous nations implicitly divested
of certain powers over non-Indigenous people. This section introduces the
Court’s approach to a separate but related question: whether a particular
stretch of land qualifies as a reservation at all. In such cases—which this
Note will refer to as “diminishment,” “disestablishment,” or “reservation
boundary” cases—the Court determines whether Congress has changed or
erased the boundaries of reservations previously set aside for Indigenous
nations.176 When a reservation is “diminished,” it continues to exist, but it
encompasses a smaller territory than its originating document delineated.177
When a reservation (or a part of a reservation) is “disestablished,”178 it ceases
to be a reservation; all the land within its former boundaries is absorbed into
the jurisdiction of the surrounding state.179
The Court has written that non-Indigenous settlement on allotted
reservations cannot, of its own force, cause diminishment or
disestablishment.180 Similarly, the Court has held that “only Congress

174. Singer, supra note 128, at 40.
175. See supra Part I.A.3 (discussing the implicit divestiture of tribal territorial authority
due to allotment and non-Indigenous settlement on reservations).
176. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 588–89, 605 (1977) (finding that
Congress intended to “disestablish” parts of a reservation promised to the Rosebud Sioux
Tribe in 1868 and thereby “diminished” the reservation’s boundaries).
177. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 358 (1998) (finding
that Congress had annexed a part of a reservation that had previously been promised to the
Yankton Sioux Tribe and that Congress had therefore “diminished” the reservation).
178. Some cases use the term “terminated” rather than “disestablished.” See infra notes
179–80.
179. See, e.g., DeCoteau v. Dist. Cnty. Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 428 (1975) (finding that an act
of Congress “terminated the Lake Traverse Reservation, and that consequently the state courts
have jurisdiction over conduct on non-Indian lands within the [former] reservation borders”).
180. See Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 504 (1973) (finding that the “presence of allotment
provisions in” reservation legislation “cannot be interpreted to mean that the reservation was
to be terminated”); Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351,
355–56 (1962) (finding that Congress, by an allotment enactment targeted at the Colville
reservation, “did no more than open the way for non-Indian settlers to own land on the
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can . . . diminish[] a reservation, and its intent to do so must be ‘clear and
plain.’”181 These rules mark important differences between reservation
boundary cases and the implicit divestiture cases: the latter have found nonIndigenous reservation settlement to directly impinge on the reach of tribal
territorial authority182 and have relied on inferences about congressional
intent without requiring that intent be clear or plain.183 In practice, however,
the Court’s method for determining diminishment and disestablishment had
largely converged with its method for parsing the substance of retained
territorial authority during the late twentieth century.184 The Court’s
inquiries into reservation boundaries, like its inquiries into tribal territorial
authority, were often inflected by reservation demography.185
In Solem v. Bartlett,186 the Court formalized the role of demographic
considerations in reservation boundary cases.187 The Solem Court listed
three kinds of evidence that it found probative of congressional intent to
diminish or disestablish a reservation: (1) the text of applicable allotmentera legislation, (2) legislative history and similar indicia of contemporaneous
understandings of the effects that the relevant statutes would have on the
status of the land, and (3) the manner in which nontribal government entities
and non-Indigenous settlers regarded the contested land following the
relevant congressional enactments.188 In explaining the third prong of this
analysis, the Court reasoned that “[w]here non-Indian settlers flooded into
the opened portion of a reservation and the area has long since lost its Indian

reservation” because the legislation did not “expressly vacat[e] [part of a] reservation and
restor[e] that land to the public domain”).
181. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. at 343 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Dion,
476 U.S. 734, 738–39 (1986)).
182. See supra notes 92–93, 107–11, 124–29, 138–39 and accompanying text (describing
how the Court determined that Indigenous nations necessarily lost aspects of their territorial
authority when Congress allowed non-Indigenous people to settle on reservations).
183. See supra notes 105–06, 111, 140 and accompanying text (describing how the Court’s
inferences about unexpressed congressional intent partially sustained the conclusion that
Indigenous nations had been implicitly divested of aspects of their territorial authority).
184. See Frickey, supra note 54, at 59–60 (describing convergences in the Court’s
approaches to the two classes of cases); see also supra Parts I.A.2–4 (discussing the Court’s
precedents on tribal territorial authority).
185. See, e.g., Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. at 356 (declaring the Yankton Sioux
reservation diminished where “fewer than 10 percent of the 1858 reservation lands [were] in
Indian hands” and “non-Indians constitute[d] over two-thirds of the population within the
1858 boundaries”); Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 604–05 (1977) (finding that
“[t]he longstanding assumption of jurisdiction by the State over an area that is over 90% nonIndian . . . not only demonstrates” a shared contemporaneous understanding that the
applicable legislation disestablished the Rosebud reservation “but has created justifiable
expectations” among non-Indigenous residents). For a recent analysis of the Court’s use of
non-Indigenous reservation settlement as evidence of congressional intent to change
reservation boundaries, see Bethany R. Berger, McGirt v. Oklahoma and the Past, Present,
and Future of Reservation Boundaries, 170 PENN. L. REV. ONLINE (forthcoming 2021),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3694051 [https://perma.cc/F7CA-5CVS].
186. 465 U.S. 463 (1984).
187. See id. at 470–71.
188. See id.
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character, . . . de facto, if not de jure, diminishment may have occurred.”189
The search for de facto changes to reservation boundaries was, the Court
cautioned, “unorthodox and potentially unreliable”;190 elsewhere, the Court
called demographic change the “least compelling” form of evidence.191 In
spite of these admonitions, however, scholars have noted that nonIndigenous settlement—the “least legally probative” factor in the Solem
framework—has historically been the “most outcome-determinative” in the
Court’s reservation boundary cases.192 Upon canvassing several decades of
precedent, Philip Frickey, writing in 1999, concluded that the Court’s
willingness to affirm reservation boundaries varied inversely with the
magnitude of non-Indigenous interests that would be unsettled thereby.193
This pattern held notwithstanding salient differences in the statutes under
examination in each case.194
The defining attributes of the Court’s theory of allotment-induced implicit
divestiture have therefore had considerable purchase in the reservation
boundary cases.195 In both lines of cases, congressional desires to eliminate
tribal territorial authority over certain lands, “formed at one time and never
implemented, . . . control the effect” of other relevant enactments.196
Similarly, both bodies of precedent suggest that Indigenous nations’ power
to exclude non-Indigenous people from reservations contained implied
powers that collapsed when non-Indigenous people were allowed to settle on
reservations.197 While the Court has articulated this theory more directly in
the implicit divestiture cases, the Court’s use of demographic evidence in the
reservation boundary cases has rendered Indian Country status—with all of
its attendant jurisdictional import—judicially revocable on lands from which
non-Indigenous people are no longer excluded.198 Just as the implicit
divestiture cases have largely limited Indigenous nations’ territorial authority
to tribal citizens,199 the reservation boundary cases suggest that
“nonmembers are ‘really’ in a region meriting the term ‘Indian country’ only
when the area has retained its ‘Indian character.’”200
189. Id. at 471.
190. Id. at 472 n.13.
191. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 356 (1998).
192. Frickey, supra note 54, at 20; see also Tweedy, supra note 171, at 143 (observing that
non-Indigenous settlers’ “justifiable expectations tend to be an explicit and central concern”
in reservation boundary cases).
193. See Frickey, supra note 54, at 17–24.
194. See id.
195. See Tweedy, supra note 171, at 137 (calling reservation diminishment and divestiture
of territorial authority “related issue[s]”). Compare supra Parts I.A.3–4 (describing the effects
of post-allotment non-Indigenous reservation settlement on tribal territorial authority), with
supra notes 184–94 and accompanying text (describing the effects of the same factors on
reservation boundaries).
196. Berger, supra note 185, at 14; see also supra Parts I.A.3–4.
197. See supra Part I.A.3 (describing how the Court found tribal territorial authority to be
contingent on the power to exclude settlers from reservations).
198. See supra notes 184–94 and accompanying text.
199. See supra Part I.A.3.
200. Frickey, supra note 54, at 27.
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The relationship between the two lines of cases surfaced in Brendale.201
The five Justices who ruled that the Yakima Nation retained its power to zone
the restricted portion of its reservation could not agree on a rationale,202 but
they appeared to be in agreement on the relevance of the Court’s
disestablishment jurisprudence.203 The two opinions that, together, partially
upheld the Yakima Nation’s zoning regulation cited Mattz v. Arnett204 for the
proposition that allotment did not change reservation boundaries and thus
could not abrogate tribal territorial authority on its own.205 Justice Blackmun
found the strands of precedent so tightly interwoven as to be mutually
controlling: “I fail to see how th[e] distinction” between the “open” and
“closed” portions of the reservation206
can be squared with this Court’s decisions specifically rejecting arguments
that those reservation areas where the [General Allotment] Act has resulted
in substantial non-Indian land ownership should be treated differently for
jurisdictional purposes from those areas where tribal holdings predominate.
And I do not see how [this distinction] can be squared with the unequivocal
holdings of our cases that the [General Allotment] Act did not diminish the
reservation status of reservation lands alienated to non-Indian owners even
where that part of the reservation had “lost its [Indian] identity.”207

The weight of non-Indigenous settlement in the Court’s reservation
boundary analyses appeared to wane in 2016, when the Court decided
Nebraska v. Parker.208 Parker held that Pender, Nebraska, a village with
1300 mostly non-Indigenous residents,209 fell within the still extant Omaha
reservation.210 The settled expectations of “non-Indian settlers who live on
the land,” though “compelling,”211 were overwhelmed by countervailing
textual evidence that Congress never sought to disestablish the
reservation.212

201. See supra notes 114–41 and accompanying text (discussing the Justices’ opinions in
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989)
(plurality opinion)).
202. See supra notes 130–33 and accompanying text.
203. See Brendale v. Confedered Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S.
408, 436, 442 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part); id. at 457 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
204. 412 U.S. 481 (1973).
205. See Brendale, 492 U.S. at 436, 442 (Stevens, J., concurring in part); id. at 457
(Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
206. See supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text (introducing the “opened” and
“closed” areas of the Yakima Nation reservation that were under consideration in Brendale).
207. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 463 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (fourth alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Mattz, 412 U.S.
481 at 484–85); see also Frickey, supra note 54, at 45 (discerning “the echo of the realistic
reading of the diminishment cases” in Justice Stevens’s focus on the “character” of an area in
his Brendale opinion).
208. 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016).
209. See id. at 1078.
210. See id. at 1076.
211. Id. at 1082.
212. See id. at 1079–82.
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Because the Parker Court did not measure the limits of Indian Country by
the size of the non-Indigenous population on reservation land, Parker set the
Court’s reservation boundary jurisprudence on a divergent path from its
implicit divestiture precedents.213 However, since the magnitude of nonIndigenous interests had often been outcome determinative in reservation
boundary cases, scholars were skeptical that the Court would apply the rule
of Parker to a case that involved far more land and far more non-Indigenous
people—such as eastern Oklahoma.214 Defying expectations, the Court did
precisely this in McGirt.215
C. McGirt
Part I.B introduced the Court’s reservation boundary precedents, a line of
cases running parallel to the implicit divestiture cases discussed in Part I.A.
This section discusses the Court’s most recent reservation boundary case:
McGirt. McGirt broke with prior reservation boundary cases,216 and its
reasoning challenges the implicit divestiture cases as well.217
1. Justice Gorsuch’s Opinion
In McGirt, the state of Oklahoma argued that it had criminal jurisdiction
over Indigenous people in territory that had been reserved to the Muscogee
(Creek) Nation in an 1866 treaty.218 The state argued that even if the
contested lands had once been a reservation,219 Congress disestablished it
around the turn of the twentieth century by allotting it and expressly
nullifying essential features of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation’s territorial
authority.220

213. Cf. supra notes 184–200 and accompanying text (describing how non-Indigenous
reservation settlement factored into reservation boundary cases before Parker).
214. E.g., Gregory Ablavsky, McGirt: Gorsuch Affirms “Rule of Law,” Not “Rule of the
Strong,” in Key Federal Indian Law Decision, SLS BLOGS: LEGAL AGGREGATE (July 10,
2020), https://law.stanford.edu/2020/07/10/mcgirt-gorsuch-affirms-rule-of-law-not-rule-ofthe-strong-in-key-federal-indian-law-decision [https://perma.cc/RH8K-YMKH] (remarking
that “Tulsa is not Pender”); Berger, supra note 185, at 17–18 (noting the vast demographic
and geographic differences between Pender, Nebraska, and eastern Oklahoma);.
215. See infra Part I.C.
216. See Oneida Nation v. Vill. of Hobart, 968 F.3d 664, 685 (7th Cir. 2020) (finding that
McGirt ended the practice of consulting “congressional intent to diminish . . . inferred from
unequivocal contextual sources even in the absence of textual support” in reservation
boundary analyses, favoring “a more textual approach consistent with statutory interpretation
more generally”).
217. See infra Part II (discussing tensions between McGirt’s reasoning and implicit
divestiture).
218. See McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2460 (2020); see also Treaty With the
Creek Indians, Creek Nation-U.S., art. 3, June 14, 1866, 14 Stat. 785 (fixing the current
boundaries of the Muscogee (Creek) reservation).
219. Oklahoma did not concede this; it pressed the argument that the treaty in question did
not create a reservation in the first place. See Brief for Respondent at 8–13, McGirt, 140 S. Ct.
2452 (No. 18-9526), 2020 WL 1478582. The Court rejected this argument. See McGirt, 140
S. Ct. at 2474–76.
220. Brief for Respondent, supra note 219, at 29–42.

2021]

REEXAMINING IMPLICIT DIVESTITURE

2399

The Court rejected these arguments—it insisted that a reservation persists
even if the lands within were parceled out during allotment.221 The majority
opinion rested on a sharp distinction between property interests and
sovereign powers and declined to read forfeitures of the former as forfeitures
of the latter.222 The Court also rejected the notion that an intent to
disestablish a reservation could be inferred from the United States’s other
incursions on tribal territorial authority223 in violation of treaty promises:
“it’s no matter how many other promises to a tribe the federal government
has already broken,” the Court wrote, if Congress has not expressly broken
its promise to set aside a reservation for an Indigenous nation.224 While
Congress had long since deprived the Muscogee (Creek) Nation of the “quiet
possession” of a reservation that was to be “forever set apart as a home,”225
the Court found no reason to hold that the reservation status of the land had
changed as a consequence of this encroachment.226
The McGirt Court was unwilling to submerge text in context.227 The Court
read Solem’s three-part test228 as a list of hierarchically ordered interpretive
strategies, not a list of necessary analytical steps.229 “[T]o ascertain and
follow the original meaning of the law before us is the only ‘step’ proper for
a court of law,” the majority wrote.230 By this reasoning, it was immaterial
that the allotment of the Muscogee (Creek) reservation was the “first step in
a plan” by which the Congresses of the allotment era hoped to erase the
reservation.231 As the majority emphasized twice in its opinion, “wishes
don’t make for laws.”232 Nor was the reservation’s subsequent history
probative of anything when the text was clear: the Court rejected
Oklahoma’s argument that the settled expectations of a large non-Indigenous
population should defeat the reservation boundaries delineated in the relevant
treaty.233 The majority wrote that it “imagine[d] some members of the 1832
Creek Tribe would be just as surprised to find” non-Indigenous people on
221. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2464 (“Congress does not disestablish a reservation simply by
allowing the transfer of individual plots, whether to Native Americans or others.”).
222. Id. at 2463–64 (holding that a conveyance of “all right, title, and interest of the Creek
Nation” to allottees did not amount to “total surrender of all tribal interests”—including the
Nation’s sovereign interests—“in the affected lands” (first quoting Creek Original Agreement,
ch. 676, § 23, 31 Stat. 861, 868 (1901); and then quoting Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072,
1079 (2016))).
223. Such incursions included, inter alia, the abolition of Muscogee (Creek) courts and the
subjection of Muscogee (Creek) legislative power to federal supervision. See McGirt, 140 S.
Ct. at 2465–66.
224. Id. at 2462.
225. Id. at 2461 & n.1 (quoting Treaty With the Creek Indians, supra note 218, 14 Stat. at
786).
226. See id. at 2473–74.
227. See id.
228. See supra notes 186–90 and accompanying text (discussing the three categories of
evidence that Solem found relevant in diminishment and disestablishment cases).
229. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2468.
230. See id.
231. Id. at 2464.
232. Id. at 2462; see id. at 2465 (“[J]ust as wishes are not laws, future plans aren’t either.”).
233. Id. at 2479.
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their reservation as those non-Indigenous people would be to find that “they
have been living in Indian country this whole time.”234
2. The Dissent
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the principal dissent.235 For the Chief Justice,
Congress’s designs for the reservation after allotment236 and the process of
non-Indigenous settlement that followed loomed large over the text of the
1866 treaty.237 The Congress that had severely curtailed tribal territorial
authority had “made no secret of its intentions” to ultimately dissolve the
Muscogee (Creek) Nation as a political unit; the Chief Justice believed those
intentions were sufficient to disestablish the reservation even if no single
statute did so expressly.238 Moreover, the dissent stressed that the history of
the reservation following its allotment—including its “subsequent treatment
by Congress, the State’s unquestioned exercise of jurisdiction, and
demographic” change239—remained an important source of evidence of
congressional intent, even in the absence of statutory ambiguity.240 Solem,
in this view, compelled the Court to consider whether the contested territory
had “long since lost its Indian character” to determine whether “de facto, if
not de jure, diminishment” had been effected.241
Against Justice Gorsuch’s distinction between the Muscogee (Creek)
Nation’s loss of its title to land and the Nation’s loss of its sovereign territory,
the Chief Justice counterposed the argument that allotment could be
functionally equivalent to outright cession of reservation land.242 The dissent
found that clear statutory language indicating full cession was unnecessary
to disestablish a reservation where “Congress provided for allotment to tribe
members who could then ‘sell their land to Indians and non-Indians
alike.’”243 Chief Justice Roberts did not expressly distinguish McGirt from
the precedents that had found allotment insufficient to change reservation
boundaries,244 but he insisted allotment was inconsistent with reservation
status because Congress had extinguished the Muscogee (Creek) Nation’s

234. Id.
235. Id. at 2482 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Justice Thomas dissented separately to explain
that he would have dismissed the petition as improvidently granted for reasons irrelevant to
this Note. See id. at 2502–04 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 2488 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress’s “prevailing
‘assumption’ . . . that ‘Indian reservations were a thing of the past’” could sustain a finding of
reservation disestablishment, even if Congress had failed to “‘detail’ precise changes to
reservation boundaries” (quoting Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 468 (1984))).
237. Id. at 2498.
238. See id. at 2484.
239. Id. at 2498.
240. See id. at 2485 (arguing that the reservation boundary precedents compelled the Court
to consult extratextual evidence to ascertain congressional intent).
241. Id. at 2486 (quoting Solem, 465 U.S. at 471).
242. Id. at 2489.
243. Id. (quoting id. at 2463 (majority opinion)).
244. See supra note 180 and accompanying text (citing cases that found allotment
compatible with continued reservation status).
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“communally held land” title and abrogated the Nation’s “governing
authority . . . over the newly distributed parcels.”245
The dissent supported its conclusion with a number of other extratextual
forms of evidence.246 The Chief Justice pointed to contemporaneous
understandings of the cumulative effect of allotment-era legislation
concerning the Muscogee (Creek) reservation,247 Oklahoma’s assumption of
jurisdiction over the contested lands,248 and the settlement of a large nonIndigenous population within reservation boundaries.249 The residual
territorial authority that Indigenous nations continue to possess over nonIndigenous people, even after implicit divestiture, was a special cause for
concern for Chief Justice Roberts: he argued that the ambiguous exceptions
to Montana would inject a “complicated layer of governance over the” newly
reaffirmed Muscogee (Creek) reservation250 and cited Brendale251 to support
the position that case-by-case tests of the sort introduced there could “mire[]
state efforts to regulate on reservation lands in significant uncertainty.”252
One factor counseling against affirming the Muscogee (Creek) reservation,
then, was the confusion that the Court’s own implicit divestiture precedents
could engender.253
II. DIVERGING DOCTRINES: TENSIONS BETWEEN MCGIRT’S REASONING
AND IMPLICIT DIVESTITURE
Part I.B described the convergence of two lines of precedent: one
regarding tribal territorial authority over non-Indigenous people on
reservations and one regarding reservation boundaries. Part I.C described
McGirt’s new method for discerning reservation boundaries, as well as the
McGirt dissent’s protests to the majority’s method. This part compares the
reasoning of McGirt’s majority and dissenting opinions to the reasoning that
sustains implicit divestiture. Although the substance of tribal territorial
authority is neither abridged nor enlarged by McGirt’s holding,254 this part
attempts to show that the majority’s reasoning conflicts in important ways
with implicit divestiture.
Because Chief Justice Roberts’s rejoinders to the majority recapitulated
common themes of the implicit divestiture cases, they throw the arguments
245. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2492 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
246. See id. at 2494–501.
247. See id. at 2494–96.
248. See id. at 2496–500.
249. See id. at 2500–01.
250. Id. at 2502.
251. Id. at 2501 n.10 (citing Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima
Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989)).
252. Id. at 2501.
253. See id. at 2501–02.
254. See Berger, supra note 185, at 36–37 (arguing that “because of [the implicit
divestiture] cases, state and tribal jurisdiction largely remains the same regardless of
reservation boundaries” after McGirt “with respect to non-Indians,” even though such “cases
are unmoored from prior jurisprudence, and stem instead from desires to protect perceived
non-Indian interests over tribal interests”).
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spurned by Justice Gorsuch into particularly sharp relief. The majority’s
rejection of the dissent’s logic would seem to be a rejection of implicit
divestiture’s underpinnings as well.255
First, the import the Chief Justice ascribed to what Philip Frickey called
“general congressional assimilative purposes unadorned by explicit
congressional intent,”256 and in particular to the reservation’s history of
allotment,257 are in step with the reasoning by which the Court extended
Oliphant to deprive Indigenous nations of territorial authority in Montana
and Brendale. Allotment’s ultimate goals figured prominently in the
Montana and Brendale Courts’ inferences about Congress’s intent to shield
non-Indigenous settlers from tribal territorial authority.258 This is precisely
the mode of analysis that the McGirt Court dismissed as elevating “wishes”
and “future plans” over laws.259 The McGirt majority drew a bright line: the
only things allotment statutes take from Indigenous nations are those which
the text necessitates.260
Second, Chief Justice Roberts would have held that the nullification of the
Muscogee (Creek) Nation’s exclusive right to use and possess its reservation
necessarily amounted to a full abrogation of tribal sovereignty.261 Cession
of the reservation to the United States and allotment of the land to individuals
were, according to this logic, functionally identical. The dissent’s framing
comports with Brendale, where allotment’s elimination of the tribal power to
exclude also implicitly—but necessarily—limited the tribal territorial
authority to zone, leaving at most an “equitable servitude,”262 if not a
wholesale dissolution of territorial authority over lands owned by non-

255. See The Supreme Court, 2019 Term—Leading Cases, McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct.
2452 (2020), 134 HARV. L. REV. 600, 600–09 (2020) (discussing the incongruity between the
presumption against tribal territorial authority over nonmembers announced in Montana v.
United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), and McGirt’s insistence on express congressional
abrogation of treaty rights).
256. Frickey, supra note 54, at 22; see also McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2484 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (pointing to extratextual evidence to support the conclusion that Congress intended
to disestablish the Muscogee (Creek) reservation).
257. See supra notes 242–45 and accompanying text.
258. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 560 n.9 (1981) (“It defies common sense
to suppose that Congress would intend that non-Indians purchasing allotted lands would
become subject to tribal jurisdiction when an avowed purpose of the allotment policy was the
ultimate destruction of tribal government.”); see also Brendale v. Confederated Tribes &
Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 437 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part)
(“[I]t is . . . improbable that Congress envisioned that the Tribe would retain its interest in
regulating the use of vast ranges of land sold in fee to nonmembers who lack any voice in
setting tribal policy.”).
259. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2462, 2465.
260. See id. at 2464–65.
261. See supra notes 242–45 and accompanying text (discussing the McGirt dissent’s
conclusion that the Muscogee (Creek) Nation effectively ceded its reservation when the
reservation was allotted).
262. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 442 (Stevens, J., concurring in part); see also supra notes 134–
39 and accompanying text (explaining Justice Stevens’s theory that Indigenous nations may
only zone reservation land if that land’s uses and inhabitants have not changed drastically
since the reservation was established).
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Indigenous people.263 By contrast, the McGirt majority used an analogy to
distinguish erosions of sovereignty from erosions of property: “[t]he federal
government issued its own land patents to many homesteaders” that
“transferred legal title,” but “no one thinks” such patents “diminished the
United States’s claim to sovereignty over any land.”264 Likewise, there is no
reason to think that Indigenous nations could not “continue to exercise
governmental functions over land even if they no longer own it
communally.”265 Drawing on the “plain terms” of the statute defining Indian
Country to include all reservation land irrespective of ownership,266 the
majority suggested that the force of its analogy to federal homestead patents
was just as strong when applied to fee lands owned by non-Indigenous
people.267
McGirt’s equating of federal homestead patents with patents issued within
the territory of “domestic dependent nations” also undermines Montana’s
incorporation of Oliphant.268 Central to Montana is the view that nonIndigenous land ownership within reservations lies presumptively beyond the
“internal” concerns of tribal governance.269 This membership-based
conception of Indigenous nations’ territorial authority sits uncomfortably
alongside McGirt’s resistance to the conflation of sovereign powers and
ownership rights; if Indigenous nations are like the United States in the
manner suggested by Justice Gorsuch’s homestead patent analogy,
reservation land owned by non-Indigenous people is hardly “external” to
Indigenous nations’ sphere of regulatory concern.270 Additionally, the rights
of the Crow Tribe, the Yakima Nation, and the Muscogee (Creek) Nation to
exclude settlers from their domains were codified in similar terms in the
treaties establishing the reservations at issue in Montana, Brendale, and
263. See Brendale, 492 U.S. at 414–32 (plurality opinion); see also supra notes 123–27
and accompanying text.
264. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2464; see also supra note 222 and accompanying text (discussing
McGirt’s distinction between conveyance of property and cession of territory); Ann E.
Tweedy, Has Federal Indian Law Finally Arrived at “The Far End of the Trail of Tears”?,
37 GA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 26), https://ssrn.com
/abstract=3684971 [https://perma.cc/3QS7-PF8T] (noting that McGirt’s observation of this
distinction marks a departure from prior precedent).
265. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2464.
266. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a).
267. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2464 (holding that by the terms of 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a), it does
not “matter whether . . . individual parcels have passed hands to non-Indians”).
268. See supra notes 109–13 and accompanying text (discussing Montana’s reliance on
Oliphant to conclude that tribal power to regulate non-Indigenous land use falls beyond
Indigenous nations’ territorial authority); see also Matthew L. M. Fletcher, Muskrat
Textualism, 115 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 66–71), https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3767096 [https://perma.cc/7FUT-HJW5] (arguing
that courts may depart from Oliphant due to McGirt’s conflicting mode of analysis).
269. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (describing Montana’s holding that
internal tribal affairs do not include matters affecting non-Indigenous reservation lands).
270. Compare McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2464 (suggesting that reservation allotments remain
subject to tribal territorial authority irrespective of who owns such allotments), with Montana
v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 563–65 (1981) (holding that allotted lands fall outside
Indigenous nations’ territorial authority when non-Indigenous people acquire them).
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McGirt, respectively.271 It is difficult, in light of these parallels, to attribute
discrepancies among these cases’ varying theories of allotment’s legal effects
to differences among the cases’ underlying histories; if the Crow Tribe’s and
Yakima Nation’s sovereign powers changed when allotment abrogated the
power to exclude nontribal citizens, then the effect should have been the same
for the Muscogee (Creek) Nation.272 The narrow inferences Justice Gorsuch
drew from allotment’s destruction of the power to exclude may therefore be
irreconcilable with core tenets of implicit divestiture.
Third, the McGirt dissent, like Justice Stevens’s Brendale opinion,
emphasized the “Indian character” of the unceded land.273 The majority
dismissed such evidence as singularly unhelpful in the absence of textual
ambiguity.274 Montana’s admonition that “treaty rights with respect to
reservation lands must be read in light of the subsequent alienation of those
lands”275 is inverted in McGirt, where the Court reads treaty rights as they
were when they were written.276 That members of the Muscogee (Creek)
Nation had “los[t] their titles by fraud or otherwise in sufficient volume that
no one remembers whose land it once was,”277 such that the reservation is
now populated predominantly by non-Indigenous people,278 was irrelevant
McGirt’s
in determining whether the reservation still existed.279
dismissiveness regarding demographics—a factor that has figured
prominently in disestablishment and implicit divestiture cases—undermines
the context-driven analyses that appear in both lines of precedent.
271. See Treaty With the Crow Indians, Crow Nation-U.S., May 7, 1868, 15 Stat. 649
(promising that a reservation will be “set apart for the absolute and undisturbed use and
occupation” of the Crow Tribe); Treaty With the Yakamas, U.S.-Yakima Nation, art. 2, June
9, 1855, 12 Stat. 951 (granting the Yakima Nation the “exclusive use and benefit” of its
reservation); Treaty With the Creek Indians, supra note 218, 14 Stat. at 785 (declaring a
reservation to be “forever set apart as a home” and guaranteeing the Muscogee (Creek) Nation
“quiet possession of [its] country”).
272. Compare McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2464 (resisting extratextual inferences from the fact of
non-Indigenous settlement on the Muscogee (Creek) reservation), with Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 414–32 (1989)
(plurality opinion) (finding allotment’s abrogation of the Yakima Nation’s power to exclude
non-Indigenous people deprived the Nation of the power to zone reservation land), and
Montana, 450 U.S. at 558–59, 564 (finding that non-Indigenous settlement deprived the Crow
Tribe of the power to prohibit hunting on non-Indigenous fee land).
273. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2486 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Solem v. Bartlett, 465
U.S. 463, 471 (1984)); Brendale, 492 U.S. at 447 (Stevens, J., concurring in part) (finding it
significant that part of the Yakima Nation reservation had “lost its character as an exclusive
tribal resource”); see also supra notes 197–200 and accompanying text (discussing the role of
“Indian character” in the Court’s reservation boundary jurisprudence prior to McGirt).
274. See McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2468–69.
275. Montana, 450 U.S. at 561 (citing Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep’t of Game, 433 U.S. 165,
174 (1977)); see also supra notes 104–13 and accompanying text (discussing the inferences
the Montana Court drew from the history of allotment on the Crow Tribe’s reservation).
276. See McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2468–69.
277. Id. at 2474.
278. Id. at 2482 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that Indigenous people constitute 10–15
percent of the population living within the 1866 boundaries of the Muscogee (Creek),
Chickasaw, Seminole, Cherokee, and Choctaw reservations).
279. See id. at 2474 (majority opinion).
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Precedents that endorsed expansive views of tribal territorial authority, but
which the Court had previously questioned or partially abandoned, find new
life in McGirt.280 The majority subtly challenged the membership-based
understanding of territorial authority that has reigned since Oliphant by
gesturing toward some of the most sovereignty-affirming language in
“Indian Tribes [are] ‘distinct political
Worcester v. Georgia281:
communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is
exclusive . . . .’”282 While the Court has written that it “[l]ong ago . . .
departed” from Worcester’s robust conception of territorial authority,283
McGirt quotes that early precedent without qualification.284 And in its
pattern of sharply limiting allotment-era statutes to their literal, necessary
effects, the McGirt majority emphasized that “congressional incursion on
tribal legislative processes” left the Muscogee (Creek) Nation with
“significant sovereign functions over the lands in question.”285 Buster v.
Wright,286 an Eighth Circuit case that had not only contemplated the
Muscogee (Creek) Nation’s retention of territorial authority after allotment
but had directly upheld the Nation’s ability to regulate the activity of nonIndigenous people within the reservation, appears in support of this portion
of McGirt.287
The pillars of McGirt’s holding conspire to put implicit divestiture on the
defensive.288 If “congressional incursion on tribal legislative processes” in
the midst of a massive land transfer campaign “only serve[s] to prove the
[Indigenous nation’s legislative] power”289 over Indian Country, then it is
hard to see how that authority is implicitly eroded by the land transfers
themselves.290 The next part of this Note argues that the Court should not
attempt to square McGirt with its implicit divestiture precedents and should
instead align its jurisprudence on territorial authority with the principles that
sustain McGirt.

280. E.g., Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905), appeal dismissed, 203 U.S. 599
(1906) (mem.);Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
281. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
282. See McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2477 (quoting Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 557).
283. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 141 (1980); see also supra
Parts I.A.2–4 (discussing the Court’s divergence from its nineteenth-century conception of
tribal territorial authority).
284. See McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2477.
285. Id. at 2466.
286. 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905), appeal dismissed, 203 U.S. 599 (1906) (mem.).
287. See id. at 950–52; see also Tweedy, supra note 264, at 24 (noting the significance of
McGirt’s citation to Buster); supra notes 58–60 (discussing Buster’s contested history in the
Court’s precedents).
288. See supra notes 255–87 and accompanying text.
289. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2466.
290. See supra notes 255–87 and accompanying text (discussing the tension between
McGirt’s reasoning and the idea that allotment necessarily abrogates tribal territorial
authority).
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III. AFTER MCGIRT: A CLEAR STATEMENT RULE FOR INDIGENOUS
NATIONS’ TERRITORIAL AUTHORITY
McGirt changes the role of non-Indigenous settlement in the Court’s
analysis of reservation boundaries,291 but Indigenous nations’ territorial
authority over non-Indigenous property on reservations remains constrained
by Oliphant, Montana, and Brendale.292 However, because McGirt
undermines the premises on which these cases depend,293 McGirt provides a
blueprint for the Court to change its prevailing theory of Indigenous nations’
territorial authority. This part argues that extending McGirt’s logic to
questions of territorial authority would retire unpredictable rules of federal
common law that produce tortured readings of clear statutes and hobble
important federal aims.294
This part identifies three independent reasons for extending McGirt’s
reasoning to questions of tribal territorial authority. Part III.A suggests that
answering questions about territorial authority and questions about
reservation boundaries the same way would best serve doctrinal coherence.
This section further argues that McGirt’s method for answering these
questions generates consistency and predictability. Part III.B contends that
the statute defining Indian Country has been distorted by implicit divestiture
and would be clarified if McGirt’s reading controlled in all instances. Part
III.C argues that a McGirt-style rule according to which Indigenous nations
retain their territorial authority unless Congress says otherwise would
advance some of the goals of the federal government’s practice of
consolidating land in trust for Indigenous nations.
A. Realigning the Court’s Approaches to Tribal Territorial Authority and
Reservation Boundaries
McGirt resolved a contradiction in the Court’s reservation boundary
decisions: while acknowledging that conveying land was not tantamount to
ceding territory, the Court had nevertheless found such conveyances highly
probative—if not dispositive—of congressional intent to disestablish
reservations.295 The majority in McGirt sharpened the distinction between
conveyance and cession and denied that the former was evidence of the
291. Compare supra Part I.B (discussing the prominent role played by non-Indigenous
settlement in prior reservation boundary cases), with supra Part I.C (discussing McGirt’s
rejection of demographic evidence in determining the boundaries of the Muscogee (Creek)
reservation).
292. See supra Parts I.A.2–4 (discussing the Court’s elaboration of implicit divestiture in
the cited cases).
293. See supra Part II (discussing the tensions between McGirt’s reasoning and implicit
divestiture).
294. See infra Parts III.A–C.
295. See supra notes 180–85, 190–94 and accompanying text (explaining that allotment
and non-Indigenous settlement have played important roles in the Court’s disestablishment
cases, despite black-letter rules that such factors are of only secondary significance in the
Court’s reservation boundary analysis); see also Berger, supra note 185, at 12–19
(contextualizing McGirt in light of the incorporation of post-allotment demographic history in
prior reservation boundary cases).
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latter.296 In smoothing this jurisprudential wrinkle, however, the Court
created new complications in the relationship between reservation boundary
cases and territorial authority cases.297 Until McGirt, the two lines of
precedent, though addressed to distinct questions, converged in their
sensitivity to non-Indigenous reservation settlement as a critical factor in
evaluating tribal interests.298 Even if the cases were not entirely coherent,
the principles for which they stood coalesced around a somewhat predictable
(if unstated) presumption against the retention of tribal sovereignty if
significant non-Indigenous interests would be affected.299
McGirt upends this practical consistency. Leaving implicit divestiture
undisturbed after McGirt would create a confusing contradiction in the
Court’s Indian law jurisprudence: on one hand, allotment and nonIndigenous settlement cannot independently affect reservation boundaries,
and the Court will not find a reservation diminished or disestablished unless
Congress has explicitly required it; on the other hand, non-Indigenous
settlement after allotment automatically constrains tribal territorial authority
even if Congress has not said so.300 This dissonance is especially jarring
when set against the Court’s recent insistence that clear statutory text is also
necessary to revoke tribal sovereign immunity301 and treaty-promised
hunting rights.302
The close kinship of the reservation boundary cases and the territorial
authority cases counsels in favor of consistent rules among them.303 It could
be argued that the interests at stake in the reservation boundary cases are
sufficiently distinct from those at stake in the territorial authority cases to
warrant independent rules that accommodate different factors and concerns.
For example, when land loses its Indian Country designation because it no
296. See supra notes 264–67 and accompanying text.
297. See supra Part II (describing how the McGirt approach to determining reservation
boundaries undermines implicit divestiture).
298. See supra Part I.B. But see Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016) (finding no
change to reservation boundaries where the population of the contested territory was
predominantly non-Indigenous); see also supra notes 208–14 and accompanying text
(discussing Parker’s position in the Court’s reservation boundary jurisprudence).
299. See supra Parts I.A.4, I.B (describing the Court’s apparent solicitude for nonIndigenous reliance interests in both reservation boundary and territorial authority cases).
300. Compare supra Parts I.A.3–4 (describing the effect of allotment and subsequent nonIndigenous reservation settlement on tribal territorial authority), with supra Part I.C.1
(describing McGirt’s rejection of the notion that allotment and subsequent non-Indigenous
reservation settlement indicate reservation disestablishment).
301. See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 790–91 (2014).
302. See Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S. Ct. 1686, 1691–92 (2019); see also The Supreme
Court, 2019 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 255, at 605–06, 608–09 (discussing the
textualist thread tying McGirt to Bay Mills Indian Community and Herrera).
303. See supra Part I.B (discussing the relationship between territorial authority cases and
reservation boundary cases); see also Robert Laurence, The Dominant Society’s Judicial
Reluctance to Allow Tribal Civil Law to Apply to Non-Indians: Reservation Diminishment,
Modern Demography and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 781, 800–01 (1996)
(arguing that the Court’s stated, if not practiced, reliance on clear congressional intent in
reservation boundary cases but on a common-law evaluation of retained powers in territorial
authority cases is inconsistent).
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longer comprises a reservation, tribal citizens there lose immunities from
state taxation and prosecution.304 Even Montana’s limited allowances for
tribal regulation of non-Indigenous land use are inapplicable.305 Judicial or
legislative withdrawals of tribal territorial authority over non-Indigenous
people may be considered less egregious intrusions on the sovereignty of
Indigenous nations. On this view, there may be a principled basis on which
to require more of Congress to disestablish a reservation than to withdraw an
element of territorial authority.
Even if the questions presented in the two types of cases touched such
disparate interests that divergent rules were appropriate as a matter of policy,
this would be insufficient to overcome the fact that McGirt undermines the
specific legal theory developed in the implicit divestiture cases.306 If
Indigenous nations can “continue to exercise governmental functions over
land even if they no longer own it communally”307—even when that land has
passed primarily to non-Indigenous people as part of a program intended to
disband tribal sovereigns—then little space remains for a strictly
membership-based conception of tribal territorial authority. To adhere to
different standards in the two types of cases would require proceeding in
open contradiction with McGirt or developing a new theory for why
Indigenous nations do not retain authority over non-Indigenous people within
their reservations. The risk that either of these approaches would generate
undue confusion and inconsistency outweighs whatever abstract merit there
may be in treating reservation boundary cases and territorial authority cases
differently. The Court could sidestep these complications by following
McGirt’s straightforward method and declining to withdraw territorial
authority unless statutory text compels it.
B. Clarifying the 1948 Indian Country Statute
The McGirt majority argued that the “plain terms” of the statutory
definition of Indian Country308 left no room for the suggestion that allotment
had had any effect on the boundaries of the Muscogee (Creek) reservation.309
“Indian Country” denotes land over which tribal governments presumptively
exercise territorial authority,310 and McGirt’s literal reading of the term’s
reservationwide scope militates against ad hoc carveouts for non-Indigenous
land. Implicit divestiture, however, has muddled this fairly straightforward

304. See supra note 19 and accompanying text; cf. supra notes 15–16 and accompanying
text.
305. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (stating that Indigenous
nations retain power over “their members and their territory,” which does not include nonIndigenous people beyond Indigenous territory (citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
515, 557 (1832))).
306. See supra Part II.
307. McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2464 (2020).
308. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (stating that “Indian Country” includes all land within
reservations “notwithstanding the issuance of any patent”).
309. See supra notes 266–67 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text.
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definition.311 The Court has inferred caveats to the clear statutory language,
creating what Ann Tweedy has called an “equitable defense” to shield nonIndigenous interests from tribal territorial authority.312 By allowing Yakima
County’s zoning ordinance to prevail over the Yakima Nation’s in Brendale,
for example, the Court effectively removed certain reservation parcels from
Indian Country for as long as those parcels remain in non-Indigenous hands.
Because the operative definition of Indian Country was enacted after
Congress abandoned the allotment program in 1934,313 it is not surprising
that its “plain terms” suggest a restoration of Indigenous territorial authority
over reservation land. Nor is it surprising that Congress’s whipsawing
changes in policy toward Indigenous nations throughout the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries314 left contradictory marks on the U.S. Code, such that
parts of the General Allotment Act remain intact alongside the expansive
Indian Country definition. These contradictions are the result of express and
implicit promises Congress made to both Indigenous nations and nonIndigenous settlers regarding reservation land. Congress has, by turns,
reneged on promises to both parties.315 The implicit divestiture cases saw
the Court selectively revive the promise that allotment would afford nonIndigenous people access to reservation land free from tribal territorial
authority, even though that promise had become incompatible with postallotment policy.316 McGirt’s text-bound interpretive approach prevents the
Court from attempting to reconcile conflicting provisions in a way that allows
earlier enactments to frustrate and distort subsequent ones.
C. Facilitating Authority-Expanding Policies
If the Court were to apply McGirt’s reasoning to questions of tribal
territorial authority, important federal initiatives could be facilitated. For
example, pursuant to a practice that is calibrated to expand tribal sovereignty
by expanding tribal land holdings, the federal government buys land to hold
in trust for Indigenous nations.317 Insofar as the Court’s crabbed view of
tribal territorial authority has made it necessary for tribal governments (or

311. See supra Parts I.A.2–4 (describing how the Court has divested Indigenous nations of
territorial authority over reservations); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (indicating that all land
within reservations is Indian Country).
312. Tweedy, supra note 171, at 181.
313. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (describing Congress’s repudiation of
allotment).
314. See supra notes 94–103, 150–53 and accompanying text (describing congressional
policies regarding Indigenous nations from the allotment era to the present).
315. See Royster, supra note 101, at 71–72 (arguing that any hopes allotment-era settlers
harbored about the abrogation of tribal territorial authority were dashed when Congress
repudiated the allotment program and should not influence constructions of post-allotment
statutes).
316. See id.
317. See Carpenter & Riley, supra note 99, at 804–05; see also Jessica A. Shoemaker, An
Introduction to American Indian Land Tenure: Mapping the Legal Landscape, 5 J.L. PROP.
& SOC’Y 1, 54 (2020) (“One trust-status benefit, of many, is that the trust status cements Indian
country status, too.”).
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their citizens) to hold property interests in land in order to govern that land,318
the Court could advance the aims of this federal policy by retreating from the
doctrine of implicit divestiture. A rule that recognizes Indigenous nations’
authority to regulate all reservation land unless Congress says otherwise
would save the federal policy favoring territorial self-determination from
reliance on incremental acquisitions of trust lands.319 Attributes of territorial
authority, such as the power to zone, could then be exercised across
reservations more expeditiously than is possible under current law.
As a majority in Brendale noted, the power to regulate land use is a critical
attribute of a sovereign’s capacity to protect the health and welfare of those
within its borders.320 The importance of land use regulations may be even
more pronounced for Indigenous nations, because particularized “norms and
values regarding land are reflected in the law of many (but not all) tribes.”321
Such laws are necessarily weakened when their operation varies according
to the identities of reservation landowners, as is mandated by implicit
divestiture.322 A clear statement rule of tribal territorial authority could
extend the geographic reach of these laws directly.
This approach would have the added benefit of assuaging some of the
dissenting Justices’ concerns in McGirt.323 As the McGirt dissent argued,324
and as the majority conceded, non-Indigenous people on reservations are not
categorically exempt from tribal territorial authority in all instances, and the
extent and nature of the obligations created by such authority may be
uncertain.325 While the dissent believed this was a reason to declare the
Muscogee (Creek) reservation disestablished, certainty about which
sovereign’s law applies in a particular area could be more equitably assured
318. See supra Part I.A.3 (discussing Indigenous nations’ loss of territorial authority over
land owned by anyone other than tribal citizens).
319. See Jessica A. Shoemaker, Complexity’s Shadow: American Indian Property,
Sovereignty, and the Future, 115 MICH. L. REV. 487, 538–40 (2017) (arguing that the
bureaucratized system by which the federal government holds tribal land in trust is undesirable
but remains popular among Indigenous nations because it is among the few methods to ensure
tribal territorial authority).
320. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S.
408, 433 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part) (“[Z]oning provides the mechanism by which
the polity ensures that neighboring uses of land are not mutually—or more often unilaterally—
destructive.”); id. at 458 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (“It would be difficult to conceive of a power more central to ‘the economic security, or
the health or welfare of the tribe’ than the power to zone.” (quoting Montana v. United States,
450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981))).
321. Carpenter & Riley, supra note 99, at 851.
322. Shoemaker, supra note 319, at 537 (“Tribes do not truly communicate their land ethics
or organize social relations through the mess of jurisdictional checkerboards, emulsions, and
property-versus-sovereignty stratifications.”).
323. See supra notes 250–52 and accompanying text (describing the McGirt dissent’s
concerns about jurisdictional confusion on the Muscogee (Creek) reservation); see also Reese,
supra note 7 (suggesting that confusion among non-Indigenous people regarding Indian
Country’s jurisdictional complexity could motivate policymakers to prescribe clearer
jurisdictional rules).
324. See McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2501–02 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
325. See id. at 2480–81; see also Reese, supra note 7 (“The civil . . . jurisdictional rules
governing Indian Country are so complicated that they’re commonly described as a ‘maze.’”).
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by extending McGirt’s clear statement rule to the domain of tribal territorial
authority. This would enhance the effectiveness of tribal regulatory
programs that require territorywide buy-in326 and would set clear terms of
negotiation and collaboration for Indigenous nations and their neighboring
states.327 It would also relieve the federal courts of the task of parsing which
elements of territorial authority are sufficiently important to Indigenous
nations that their “political integrity, . . . economic security, or . . . health or
welfare” is implicated328—an inquiry that should turn on the specific aims
and values of particular Indigenous nations and which federal courts are, for
that reason, ill-equipped to undertake.329 Finally, an adoption of McGirt’s
principles would harken back to the pre-Oliphant conception of territorial
authority, which provided all parties with the sort of cheap information
regarding jurisdiction that the dissent extols: non-Indigenous settlers were
on notice that they were subject to tribal territorial authority on
reservations.330
Replacing implicit divestiture with McGirt’s reasoning would not remove
all obstacles to tribal territorial authority over reservations. For example,
Indigenous nations’ power over reservation property is significantly
constrained by byzantine federal regulatory schemes as well.331 However,
extending McGirt to questions of tribal territorial authority would at least
remove one impediment to the current federal policy favoring territorial selfdetermination.
To be sure, implicit divestiture does not prevent Congress from returning
the elements of tribal territorial authority that the Court has withdrawn.332
By McGirt’s own terms, it is not the Court’s job to give force to Congress’s
desired but unenacted policies.333 It may therefore seem antithetical to
326. See, e.g., Katherine Florey, Making It Work: Tribal Innovation, State Reaction, and
the Future of Tribes as Regulatory Laboratories, 92 WASH. L. REV. 713, 742–43, 753–54
(2017) (describing tribal governments’ attempts to implement gun control legislation and
observing that such regulatory schemes “require[] fairly uniform compliance to be effective,”
such that they “may simply be of little value” to the extent that they “apply to only a fraction
of the [reservation] population”); id. at 745–46 (making a similar point about environmental
regulations that protect the specific significance of shared elements of the landscape like
bodies of water).
327. See id. at 759–62.
328. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981) (discussing when an Indigenous
nation’s “inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee
lands within its reservation” may be lawful); see also supra note 113 and accompanying text
(describing this aspect of Montana’s holding).
329. See Elizabeth A. Reese, The Other American Law, 73 STAN. L. REV. 555, 631–33
(2021).
330. See supra notes 59–66 and accompanying text (describing the clarity of tribal
territorial authority prior to the Court’s introduction of implicit divestiture).
331. See generally Shoemaker, supra note 319 (arguing that federal policy regarding
Indigenous property interests on reservations is restrictive, confusing, and difficult to
administer).
332. See supra notes 82–86 and accompanying text (indicating that implicit divestiture is
a creature of federal common law).
333. See McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2462 (2020) (“[W]ishes don’t make for
laws.”).
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McGirt to entertain general concerns about advancing federal policy aims.
This argument would ignore the fact that Congress codified its policy in favor
of broadening Indigenous nations’ territorial authority when it specified, in
1948, that Indian Country spans all reservations.334 According to McGirt,
Congress cannot acquiesce in the de facto invalidation of its previous
reservation-related enactments by failing to remedy violations of those
enactments.335 Congress has therefore not given force to implicit divestiture
simply by declining to expressly repudiate it.336
McGirt is entirely consistent with the contention that Congress must speak
clearly if it is willing to endorse implicit divestiture. If Congress is not so
willing, then it has been enjoying the protection of the doctrine’s political
shield while evading accountability for the erosion of Indigenous nations’
territorial authority. It has neither had to interfere with non-Indigenous
settlers’ expectations of immunity from tribal territorial authority nor has it
had to leave its fingerprints on the ugly work of breaking treaties
expressly.337 If that is the case, the doctrine has functioned to “sav[e] the
political branches [from] embarrassment,” which “is not one of [the Court’s]
constitutionally assigned prerogatives.”338
CONCLUSION
Over the past several decades, the Supreme Court has deprived Indigenous
nations of aspects of their sovereignty even when Congress has not expressly
compelled that result. The Court modified its historical understanding of
“domestic dependent nation” status to exclude most forms of tribal territorial
authority over non-Indigenous people who acquired land on reservations.
Similarly, when faced with questions about reservation boundaries, the Court
was likely to find that a reservation had shrunk or disappeared if a large nonIndigenous population had settled there. Both lines of cases rested on
inferences about the intentions of the Congresses that implemented the
allotment policy, conceptions of tribal territorial authority that could operate
only on lands in which Indigenous nations or their citizens held property
interests, and a conviction that historical developments could eclipse tribal
rights and powers guaranteed by treaties.
In McGirt, the Court forswore these principles in finding that the
Muscogee (Creek) Nation’s reservation retained the boundaries that the
334. See supra Part III.B.
335. See McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2468 (calling it “mistaken” to believe that anything but
express congressional statements can affect reservation boundaries, regardless of intervening
historical developments that Congress enabled or left unchallenged).
336. Congress has repudiated the doctrine to a limited extent at times. See supra notes 75,
84–85 and accompanying text.
337. See Michael C. Dorf, What Good Is a Treaty That Congress Can Simply Discard?:
Quite a Bit, as the Creek Nation’s Victory in the Supreme Court Shows, JUSTIA: VERDICT (July
22, 2020), https://verdict.justia.com/2020/07/22/what-good-is-a-treaty-that-congress-cansimply-discard [https://perma.cc/3D6X-HATT] (arguing that political constraints make it
difficult for legislators to abrogate treaties if they are forced to do so openly).
338. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2462.
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Nation and the United States had agreed on in 1866. Because the same
principles that McGirt rejected form the bedrock of implicit divestiture, the
adoption of McGirt’s methodology in cases regarding the substance of tribal
territorial authority would produce a more consistent jurisprudence.
Abandoning implicit divestiture would clarify important statutory provisions
whose meanings have been clouded by the doctrine and would advance the
federal policy of expanding the land base subject to tribal territorial authority.
The application of McGirt in the domain of tribal territorial authority would
also prevent the Court from shielding non-Indigenous owners of reservation
land from the jurisdictional consequences of the fact that their property
remains within Indian Country.

